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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause2 prohibits the admission of testimonial 
                                                                
*Staff Attorney, Boston Municipal Court and Adjunct Instructor of Legal Research & 
Writing, New England School of Law. B.A., Stonehill College, 1987; J.D., Boston College 
Law School, 1990. 
1Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).   
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statements by a witness who is absent from trial unless the declarant is unavailable 
and the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statements.3  Thus, 
the Court imposed an absolute bar on the admission of testimonial statements in the 
absence of a prior opportunity by the defendant to cross-examine those statements.4  
Justice Scalia authored the opinion in which the Court reasoned that “the principal 
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused.”5   
In establishing cross-examination as the prerequisite for the admission of 
testimonial evidence, the Court in Crawford did not conclusively define the term 
“testimonial.”  Rather, it set forth various descriptions and examples of testimonial 
statements without explicitly adopting a definition.6  Therefore, a determination of 
whether a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a statement now requires a 
determination of whether that statement is testimonial. 
This Article will analyze whether the post-Crawford decisions have been 
consistent in their treatment of statements that qualify as excited utterances7 in light 
of the Confrontation Clause principles and various definitions of testimonial in 
Crawford.  Part II of this Article will provide a discussion of the Crawford decision 
itself and an analysis of Crawford’s treatment of earlier cases in this area.8  Part III 
of this Article will provide a discussion and analysis of court decisions that have 
applied Crawford in the context of excited utterances.9  It will do this by examining 
the factors that these courts have considered and emphasized in their analysis of 
whether an excited utterance qualifies as a testimonial statement, which would 
implicate the Confrontation Clause protections set forth in Crawford.  Part IV of this 
Article will discuss Crawford’s impact on the admission of excited utterances by 
analyzing the various factors from the cases under the different formulations of 
“testimonial” set forth in Crawford.10  Part IV will then propose a composite 
definition of “testimonial” that will take into account the three definitions from 
Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases.  Part V of this Article 
                                                          
2U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . 
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).  
3Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
4Id. at 61. 
5Id. at 50. 
6Id. at 51-52. 
7Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an “excited utterance” is “not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.”  FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  The 
Rule defines an excited utterance as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant [is] under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition.”  
Id.  The underlying rationale for the admission of excited utterances under Rule 803(2) is that 
a person who is still under the stress of an exciting event or experience is unlikely to possess 
the reflective capacity that is needed to manufacture a lie.  See, e.g., United States v. Taveras, 
380 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2004). 
8See infra notes 13-77 and accompanying text. 
9See infra notes 78-340 and accompanying text. 
10See infra notes 341-81 and accompanying text. 
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concludes that the intended positive impact of the Crawford decision will be realized 
only if courts refrain from applying its protections to situations that the Supreme 
Court neither intended nor contemplated.11 
II.  RATIONALE OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT 
A.  “Testimonial” Statements under Crawford. 
Under Crawford, the threshold issue on a particular statement’s admissibility 
against a defendant is whether the statement is testimonial.  The Court in Crawford 
declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,”12 but stated that the 
term clearly “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”13  Quoting 
from the Petitioner’s brief, the Court stated that the core class of testimonial 
statements comes in various forms: “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross examine [such as a deposition], or 
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially.’”14  
Another description of testimonial statements set forth by the Court in Crawford 
are those “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”15  In general, the 
definition of testimonial would include “statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”16  A statement need not be 
sworn in order to be classified as testimonial.17 
                                                                
11See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text. 
12See generally Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis 
of Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581 (2006) (proposing a 
framework for deciding whether a statement is testimonial by considering the degree of 
formality of the statement, the intent of the declarant and the law enforcement officer to whom 
the statement was made, and the extent of government involvement in the production of the 
statement). 
13Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  The Court in Crawford left no 
uncertainty in the area of police interrogations when declaring that “[s]tatements taken by 
police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow 
standard.”  Id. at 52.  The Court further clarified the meaning of testimonial statements in the 
context of police interrogations in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) 
(holding that a statement is nontestimonial when purpose of interrogation is to enable police to 
meet an ongoing emergency and testimonial when purpose of interrogation is to establish prior 
events that may be relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution).  See infra notes 225-340 
and accompanying text for an analysis and discussion of both kinds of statements. 
14Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 
02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940). 
15Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
16Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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In its discussion of testimonial statements, the Court in Crawford was 
particularly concerned about any statements given to officers or government agents 
because “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance 
does not.”18  The involvement of government representatives is an important factor in 
the determination of whether evidence qualifies as “testimonial” under Crawford: 
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with 
any eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a 
fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers 
were keenly familiar.  This consideration does not evaporate when 
testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, 
even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.19 
The Court in Crawford limited its decision to testimonial hearsay, stating that 
“[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.”20  With 
respect to testimonial evidence, however, the Sixth Amendment requires both 
unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.21 
The Court’s decision in Crawford overruled its prior decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts.22  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of the statement of an unavailable 
witness against a criminal defendant if the statement bears “adequate indicia of 
reliability.”23  This test requires the evidence either to fall within a “firmly rooted 
hearsay exception,” or to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”24   
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 
which was joined by Justice O’Connor.  The Chief Justice did not agree with the 
majority’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts,25 or with the distinction made by the 
majority between testimonial and nontestimonial statements.26  Chief Justice 
                                                          
21754961).  In evaluating the various formulations of testimonial statements, the Court stated 
that all “share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause’s coverage at 
various levels of abstraction around it.”  Id. 
17See id.; see also W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause 
After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 17-19 
(2005). 
18Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
19Id. at 56 n.7. 
20Id. at 68. 
21Id. 
22Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
23Id. at 66. 
24Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1017-22 (1998) (arguing that the Roberts framework failed to reflect some of 
the enduring principles of the Confrontation Clause). 
25Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
26Id. at 69-73. 
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Rehnquist also took issue with the broad definition of testimonial statements adopted 
by the majority: 
[A]ny classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn 
affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy for 
what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been liberally 
admitted as substantive evidence like it is today.27 
Rehnquist would have reached the same result as the majority without overruling 
Ohio v. Roberts.  He reasoned that the statement at issue in Crawford was not 
admissible based on Idaho v. Wright,28 which held that corroboration of an out-of-
court statement’s truthfulness by other evidence at trial was an insufficient basis to 
admit the statement.29  
Prior to Crawford, the United States Supreme Court had never distinguished 
between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.30  Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern in his concurring opinion that 
the majority’s failure to clarify exactly what kind of evidence qualifies as 
“testimonial” would result in confusion in the lower courts.31 
B.  Facts and Procedural History of Crawford 
The defendant in Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife, 
Sylvia.32  At the defendant’s trial for assault and attempted murder, the prosecution 
played for the jury Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to the police describing the 
confrontation between the defendant and the victim.33  The defendant claimed self-
defense.34  Because of the state marital privilege barring a spouse from testifying 
without the other spouse’s consent, Sylvia did not testify at the trial.35  Therefore, the 
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia’s statement.36    
Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for 
statements against penal interest based on her admission that she had led the 
                                                                
27Id. at 71. 
28Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
29Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Amber Allred Furbee, 
Note, Legal Crossroads: The Hearsay Rule Meets the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
in Crawford v. Washington, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 999, 1050-59 (2005) (stating that 
application of standards enunciated in Roberts and Wright would have produced the same 
result reached by the majority in Crawford). 
30See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also State v. Rivera, 844 
A.2d 191, 202 n.13 (2004) (stating that the Crawford Court’s distinction between testimonial 
and nontestimonial hearsay is a novel one under the Confrontation Clause). 
31Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
32Id. at 38 (majority opinion). 
33Id. 
34Id. at 40. 
35Id. 
36Id. at 38. 
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defendant to the victim’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault.37  The 
prosecution sought to use Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement as evidence that the 
stabbing was not in self-defense.38  The defendant claimed that admission of Sylvia’s 
statement violated his federal constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him under the Sixth Amendment.39  The trial court admitted the statement 
based on Ohio v. Roberts,40 ruling that the statement was trustworthy under the 
Roberts standard, and offered several reasons to support that determination.41  
The jury convicted the defendant of assault, and the Washington Court of 
Appeals reversed.42  The Court of Appeals held that Sylvia’s statement did not bear 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and offered several reasons in support of 
its conclusion.43  The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s 
conviction, concluding that the statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness.44  
Specifically, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the similarities between the 
defendant’s confession and Sylvia’s statement in reaching the conclusion that the 
statement was trustworthy.45  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
prosecution’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause, and the 
Court reversed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.46  
C.  Crawford’s Treatment of Sixth Amendment Precedent 
The Court in Crawford used the case as an opportunity to reconsider the standard 
articulated in Ohio v. Roberts47 for the admissibility of an unavailable witness’s out 
                                                                
37Id. at 40. 
38Id. 
39Id. 
40Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
41Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text and infra notes 
47-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roberts. 
42Id. at 41.  The Court of Appeals of Washington reversed the conviction in an 
unpublished opinion.  State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119 (Wash. Ct. App. 
July 30, 2001). 
43Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. 
44See id.; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002). 
45See Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663-64; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42.  The Washington 
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Sylvia’s statement did not have to 
bear guarantees of trustworthiness because the defendant waived his confrontation rights by 
invoking the marital privilege.  Crawford, 54 P.3d at 660.  The court declined to force the 
defendant to choose between the marital privilege and confronting his spouse.  Id.  The 
prosecution did not challenge that holding in the United States Supreme Court.  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 42 n.1. 
46Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 68-69. 
47Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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of court statement.48  The Court stated that the test in Ohio v. Roberts fails to protect 
criminal defendants against typical Confrontation Clause violations.49   
In Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery of checks and possession of 
stolen credit cards.50  At the preliminary hearing on the matter, the defendant’s 
lawyer called a witness who testified that she knew the defendant and that she had 
allowed the defendant to use her apartment for several days while she was away.51  
The defendant’s attorney tried to obtain an admission from the witness that she had 
given the checks and credit cards to the defendant without telling him that he did not 
have permission to use them.52  The witness denied that she had done so.53 
When the witness became unavailable for the trial, the prosecution sought to 
admit the transcript of her testimony at the preliminary hearing.54  The trial court 
admitted the transcript into evidence, and the defendant was convicted.55  The Ohio 
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the prosecution had failed to 
make a good faith effort to secure the witness’s attendance.56  The Supreme Court of 
Ohio affirmed on other grounds, holding that the witness was unavailable and that 
the transcript was inadmissible at the defendant’s trial.57  The rationale was that even 
though the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the 
preliminary hearing, this was not the equivalent of constitutional confrontation at 
trial.58 
In its analysis of whether the prior testimony of the witness at the preliminary 
hearing bore “adequate indicia of reliability,” the United States Supreme Court in 
Roberts declined to specify the level of questioning that would be sufficient to satisfy 
the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of cross-examination.59  The Court held, 
however, that the defendant’s attorney had tested the witness’s testimony “with the 
equivalent of significant cross-examination.”60  Therefore, the Supreme Court relied 
on the defendant’s prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness in its analysis of 
                                                                
48Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
49Id. at 60. 
50Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
51Id.  The witness was the daughter of the couple from whom the defendant had allegedly 
stolen the credit cards and the checks.  Id. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 59. 
55Id. at 60. 
56Id. 
57Id. at 61. 
58Id. 
59Id. at 68-70. 
60Id. at 70.  The Roberts Court stated that the defense attorney’s questioning of the witness 
at the preliminary hearing “clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form,” id., and 
that it “comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination:” challenging the 
declarant’s veracity, perception, memory and intended meaning.  Id. at 71. 
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whether the transcript was sufficiently reliable.61  The Court in Crawford disagreed 
with the rationale of Roberts but not the result.62 
The Crawford opinion contains an extensive history of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause and the development of a criminal defendant’s right to 
confront his or her accusers.63  The Court concluded that when dealing with 
testimonial statements, the framers of the Constitution did not mean to “leave the 
Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to 
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”64  The Confrontation Clause is concerned with 
more than reliability of evidence.65  It is concerned with the manner in which the 
reliability of evidence is tested, and the required test is cross-examination.66 
The Court in Crawford cited to one of its earlier decisions, Dutton v. Evans,67 to 
illustrate the limitations on the definition of testimonial statements.68  In Dutton, a 
statement made to someone other than a law enforcement officer or agent of the 
government was admissible against a defendant at his murder trial by the person to 
whom the statement was made.69  Shaw’s testimony about what Williams had told 
                                                                
61Id. at 73; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151, 158-59 (1970) (Confrontation 
Clause not violated by admission at trial of witness’s prior testimony from a preliminary 
hearing—testimony that was given under oath and subject to cross examination—when 
witness was testifying at trial and subject to full and effective cross-examination); Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (Confrontation Clause not violated by admission 
at trial of a transcribed copy of testimony of two witnesses from a previous trial, when 
witnesses had died in the interim and were fully examined and cross-examined when they 
testified in former trial); Thomas Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 753, 784-87 (2005) (arguing that one of the ways to facilitate domestic violence 
prosecutions after Crawford is to create more opportunities for cross-examination of victims in 
preliminary hearings, depositions, and other pretrial proceedings). 
62Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (stating that Roberts “hew[ed] closely to the traditional line” in 
its outcome because of its emphasis on the defendant’s earlier opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness). 
63Id. at 43-50.  The decision sets forth the story of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh to 
illustrate the inherent unfairness in a system that does not permit the accused to confront the 
witnesses against him.  Id. at 44-45.  See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of 
the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
557, 570-71 (1992); Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: 
The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
763, 765-66 (2000). 
64Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
65Id.   
66Id. 
67Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
68Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. 
69Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77, 87-88.  In Dutton, a prosecution witness named Shaw testified 
that he and Williams, who was an accomplice of the defendant Evans in the alleged murder, 
had been fellow prisoners during the time that Williams was arraigned on the murder charge.  
Id. at 77.  Shaw testified that when Williams returned to the penitentiary after the arraignment, 
Shaw asked him how he had made out.  Id.  Shaw testified that Williams had responded, “‘If it 
hadn’t been for [the defendant] Alex Evans, we wouldn’t be in this now.’”  Id.  The statement 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
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him was admitted on the basis of a Georgia statutory hearsay exception.  The statute 
provided that if a conspiracy had been proved, any statement made by a conspirator 
“during the pendency of the criminal project” was admissible against any other 
conspirator.70  The hearsay exception applied by Georgia allowed the introduction of 
out-of-court statements made both during the course of the conspiracy and the 
concealment of the conspiracy.71  The absence of a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the statement in Dutton was not a bar to its admission because the statement 
was not testimonial.72  
The focus on government officers and agents in the determination of whether 
statements qualify as testimonial casts some doubt on the holding in White v. 
Illinois.73  The Court in Crawford acknowledged that its holding was not entirely 
consistent with the holding of White.74   In White, statements of a child victim to an 
investigating police officer were admitted as spontaneous declarations.75   The 
Crawford Court acknowledged that its analysis was “in tension” with the holding in 
White,76 but it declined to state specifically whether White survived the decision in 
Crawford.77 
                                                          
was admitted over the objection of defense counsel, and Shaw was cross-examined at length.  
Id. at 77-78. 
70Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78. 
71Id. at 81. 
72Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.  But see In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005) (holding that grandmother’s testimony about child’s statements to her regarding sexual 
abuse implicated the Confrontation Clause even though the statements were not made to a 
government official), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).  See infra note 328 
for a discussion of In re E.H. 
73White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
74Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
75White, 502 U.S. at 349-51. 
76Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
77The Court later characterized the holding in White as the “one arguable exception” to the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements of unavailability of the witness and prior cross-
examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay.  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 
2275 (2006).  In a concurring opinion in White, Justice Thomas noted that the Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence to that point had implicitly assumed that all hearsay declarants were 
“witnesses against” a defendant within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  White, 502 
U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice Thomas 
argued that neither the history nor the text of the Confrontation Clause supported this 
assumption, id. at 358, and suggested the following interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: 
“The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies 
at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as 
they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.”  Id. at 365.  Justice Thomas reiterated this position in subsequent 
decisions.  See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143-44 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First 
Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (arguing that the 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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III.  IMPACT ON EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION 
Federal and state courts have reached different conclusions on the admissibility 
of excited utterances under Crawford based on their consideration of various factors 
and the importance placed upon each one.78  A number of courts have concluded that 
excited utterances, even when made to a police officer in response to some degree of 
questioning, are not testimonial.79  Other courts have taken the opposite viewpoint, 
reasoning that an excited utterance may be testimonial if the questioning by law 
enforcement officers is for investigatory and fact-gathering purposes in anticipation 
of a future prosecution.80  Structured and detailed questioning is more likely to result 
in responses that implicate Crawford, even if the responses qualify as excited 
utterances under state evidentiary rules.81  
                                                          
Confrontation Clause “encompasses only those ‘witnesses’ who testify either by taking the 
stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like”). 
78One view is that “[o]n paper, Crawford is a thorough originalist resolution of a 
constitutional question.  In application, however, the Court’s analysis raises substantial 
questions and leaves them unanswered.  Equally as significant as the Court’s holding, then, is 
what it failed to resolve—and indeed explicitly declined to address.”  See The Supreme Court, 
2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 316, 321 (2004); see also Lininger, supra 
note 61, at 777-81.  Professor Lininger explains that the Crawford decision has caused lower 
courts to be inconsistent in their application of various factors in cases involving domestic 
violence prosecutions, and also suggests several reforms that would enable prosecutors to 
convict batterers within the parameters set out in Crawford.  Id.   
The purpose of this Article is to provide an in-depth discussion of the various factors that 
the courts have utilized and the context in which the factors arise in order to determine more 
accurately whether an excited utterance is admissible against a defendant under Crawford. 
79See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding victim’s 
statements to police officer not testimonial where police interaction with victim was 
unstructured and questioning not suggestive). 
80See, e.g., Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d 145, 150-51 (D.C. 2005) (finding that when 
police questioned the victim, they were aware of the nature of the crime and the participants’ 
identities). 
81See, e.g., Siler v. Ohio, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004) (vacating State v. Siler, No. 02COA028, 
2003 WL 22429053 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003)).  Even though approximately eight hours 
had passed between the estimated time of the victim’s death and the statement of the victim’s 
child to the officers, the child’s statement was admitted as an excited utterance because a child 
may be under the stress and excitement of events related to a crime for a longer period than an 
adult.  Siler, 2003 WL 22429053, at *6.  In addition, the child gave his statement to the 
officers in the course of two interviews.  Id.  The first interview lasted between thirty and 
forty-five minutes, and the second interview lasted for one hour.  Id. 
On remand, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the police had obtained the child’s 
statements through “a structured police interrogation” and that the statements were, therefore, 
testimonial.  State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal allowed, 847 
N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006). 
In light of Crawford, the Supreme Court has remanded for further consideration, three 
cases in which statements made to the police were admitted against defendants at trial based 
on hearsay exceptions other than the excited utterance.  See Goff v. Ohio, 541 U.S. 1083 
(2004) (admitting the statement of defendant’s wife made to police at trial as a statement 
against penal interest when the wife was unavailable for trial).  On remand, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals held that statements made by Mr. Goff’s wife to the police while they were 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
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Courts that agree on the result in these cases still differ on their rationales.  Some 
court decisions that have held excited utterances to be nontestimonial focus on the 
fact that the declarant initiated the contact with police and gave the statement without 
first being approached.  Others emphasize that even if the declarant provided the 
statement in response to questioning, the questioning must be sufficiently structured 
and controlled to bring the statement within the Crawford rule.  Still others examine 
the declarant’s motivation in providing the statement and conclude that it is 
nontestimonial if given to obtain aid or to reduce the level of danger and not to aid 
law enforcement in a future prosecution.82   
The Supreme Court has confirmed that courts must distinguish between 
statements that are made to address an ongoing emergency (nontestimonial) and 
statements that are made to provide information that can be used in a later 
prosecution (testimonial).83  Although the Court’s decision in Davis somewhat 
clarified Crawford’s reach, the line between these two kinds of statements can be 
difficult to draw.84  A combination of these factors in any one case only exacerbates 
the difficulty.85 
                                                          
interrogating her were not admissible against Mr. Goff at his trial.  State v. Goff, No. 21320, 
2005 WL 236377, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2005).    
See also Prasertphong v. Arizona, 75 P.3d 675 (Ariz. 2003), vacated, 541 U.S. 1039 
(2004) (admitting statements made to police by an individual involved in the crime for which 
the defendant was prosecuted as statements against penal interest); People v. Castille, 133 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), vacated, Shields v. California, 541 U.S. 930 (2004) 
(admitting statements made by co-defendants to police in a joint interview against each 
defendant as adoptive admissions and statements of a party—two firmly rooted hearsay 
exceptions).  On remand, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding 
that an adoptive admission elicited during a joint police interrogation does not implicate the 
Sixth Amendment or Crawford.  See People v. Castille, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 81-85 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded a case to the 
district court to consider whether the use of guilty plea allocutions of alleged co-conspirators 
against a defendant to prove the charged conspiracy violates Crawford.  United States v. 
Pandy, No. 03-1553, 2004 WL 960023, at *1-2 (2d Cir. May 5, 2004).   
82See State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 812-13 (Minn. 2005) (listing eight factors or 
considerations to guide courts when determining whether a particular statement is testimonial), 
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota for further consideration in light of Davis). 
83Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
84Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating that the modified standard in Davis “yields no predictable results to police officers and 
prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”). 
85See generally John F. Yetter, Wrestling With Crawford v. Washington and the New 
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. BAR. J. 26, 29 (2004) (“One can imagine, for 
instance, excited utterances subdivided into ‘really excited utterances’ that are nontestimonial 
statements, standard ‘excited utterances’ that could go either way, and ‘mildly excited 
utterances’ that would be admissible under the hearsay exception but excluded because they 
contain ‘testimonial’ statements.”).  
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
570 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:559 
A.  Contact Initiated by Declarant 
A number of court decisions issued after Crawford have held excited utterances 
to be nontestimonial when the declarant makes the statement after initiating contact 
with law enforcement authorities.  Because the declarant initiates the interaction in 
these cases, the statement is not taken “in the course of [a police] interrogation,”86 
and, therefore, is not testimonial.  Even though the statement might still qualify as “a 
formal statement to government officers,”87 the absence of interrogation or formal 
questioning is regarded as more significant.88 
An example of this scenario is Leavitt v. Arave.89  In Leavitt, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court properly admitted an 
excited utterance made by the victim to the police, reasoning that the statement was 
not “testimonial” under Crawford.90  In Leavitt, the victim had been frightened on the 
night before her death by a prowler at her home.91  She called the police and told 
them that she thought the prowler was the defendant because he had tried to talk 
himself into her home earlier that day.92  The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
argument that admission of the hearsay testimony violated his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.93  The court acknowledged that the question 
was close but “[did] not believe that [the victim’s] statements [were] of the kind with 
which Crawford was concerned, namely, testimonial statements.”94  The court went 
on to explain the distinction between the victim’s statements and the statements in 
Crawford: 
                                                                
86Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
87Id. at 51.  It is worth noting that subsequent to its decision in Crawford, the Supreme 
Court stated in dicta that statements made in the absence of interrogation could also qualify as 
testimonial.  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.  The Supreme Court dealt only with statements 
produced as the result of interrogations because those were the only statements involved in 
Davis and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana.  See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
88See Dickinson, supra note 63, at 806-09.  Mr. Dickinson describes the difference 
between these kinds of statements as follows:  
The difference is subtle, yet defensible.  The key is to look at the circumstances 
surrounding the giving of the out-of-court statement to the government.  For instance, 
if a witness walks up to a police officer and announces, “I saw Jim shoot Lisa,” that 
type of situation in no way resembles the sorts of abuses concerning the framers.  This 
wholly unsolicited statement does not resemble the prosecutorial abuses common in 
the trial by affidavit scenario because the statement was not elicited by the government 
for purposes of trial. 
Id. at 807 n.364. 
89Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1105 (2005). 




94Id. at 683 n.22. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
2006] TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS, EXCITED UTTERANCES 571 
We do not think that [the victim’s] statements to the police she called to 
her home fall within the compass of [the examples of the types of 
statements that qualify as testimonial in the Crawford decision. The 
victim], not the police, initiated their interaction.  She was in no way 
being interrogated by them but instead sought their help in ending a 
frightening intrusion into her home.  Thus, we do not believe that the 
admission of her hearsay statements against [the defendant] implicate “the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed[:] . . . the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”95 
During the defendant’s murder trial in State v. Barnes,96 the court used similar 
reasoning in admitting statements made by the defendant’s mother to a police officer, 
following a prior assault.97  The officer testified that in March 1998 the defendant’s 
mother drove herself to the police station, entered the station crying and sobbing and 
stated that her son had assaulted her and threatened to kill her.98  The court admitted 
the testimony as an excited utterance.99 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that the victim’s statements to 
the police were not testimonial under Crawford.100  The court based its conclusion on 
the fact that the victim had gone to the police station on her own, not because the 
police had sought her out or requested her presence.101  In addition, the victim was 
still under the stress of the event when she made the statements, and any questions 
posed by the police were for the purpose of determining why she was distressed.102  
There was an absence of structured police questioning, and the police had no reason 
to believe that any wrongdoing had occurred until the victim made her statements.103 
In State v. Anderson,104 a group of juveniles flagged down a police officer who 
was attempting to locate the source of an activated burglar alarm.105  The officer 
stopped and asked the group what was going on, and the juveniles told him that a 
“large black man with a bald head just kicked in the door of a business across the 
                                                                
95Id. at 684 n.22 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 50 (2004)).  
96State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004). 
97Id. at 209.   
98Id. 
99Id. 
100Id. at 211. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
103Id.  The court=s reasoning in Barnes touches upon some of the other factors that are 
discussed infra. 
104State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Jan. 27, 2005), aff’d, 183 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 47 (2006). 
105Id. at *1. 
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street” and that he was “still inside.”106  The officer drove to the business, discovered 
the door open and found the defendant inside.107 
The court in Anderson held that the statements were admissible as excited 
utterances and did not fit into any of the core testimonial categories as set forth in 
Crawford.108  The court went on to explain that “the essential characteristics that 
cause the juveniles’ statements to fall within the ambit of the excited utterance 
exception conflict with the characteristics that would make them testimonial.”109 
A shortcoming in the Anderson court’s analysis is that it links the evidentiary 
issue too closely with the Confrontation Clause issue.110  A rationale that would be 
more consistent with Crawford would hold that the juveniles’ excited utterances 
were not testimonial because of their actions in initiating contact with the police.111  
In affirming the admission of the statements on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court emphasized that the police were in a “preliminary investigational mode” when 
they spoke to the witnesses.112  They were trying to determine exactly what was 
happening and were not gathering evidence for a future prosecution.113 
These cases illustrate one factor to be used by lower courts in their application of 
Crawford.  When the declarant initiates the contact with governmental authorities 
and makes a statement, the statement falls outside of the definition of “testimonial” 
in Crawford.  In such cases, the law of evidence determines admissibility of the 
                                                                
106Id.  
107Id. 
108Id. at *3-4. 
109Id. at *4. 
110See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“Leaving the regulation of out-
of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to 
prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”). 
111See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
the victim’s statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial because the victim initiated 
the 911 call to request assistance); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871-74 (2004) 
(holding that the statements of the domestic assault victim, who approached a police officer 
seated in the passenger seat of a van that was stopped in traffic at a red light, were not 
testimonial because the victim initiated contact with the police officer immediately after the 
incident in order to seek immediate protection); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 
2567124, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding that the restaurant employee’s statement 
to police that the defendant “just robbed me.  He just robbed us in Burger King.” immediately 
following a robbery of the restaurant was not testimonial because the employee, who was 
injured in the robbery, initiated the exchange and did not make the statement in response to 
any police questioning); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 24-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that statements of the victim were not testimonial because the victim, not the police, initiated 
the statements immediately after the rescue from the criminal incident without the police 
asking any questions), aff’d, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2977 
(2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for 
further consideration in light of Davis), dismissed as moot, 636 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 2006) 
(dismissing in light of defendant’s death). 
112State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 353 (Tenn. 2006). 
113Id. 
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statement.  The focus in these cases is on the declarant’s timing in the making of the 
excited utterance, and it is irrelevant that the statement is made to a law enforcement 
officer or government official. 
B.  Location of Interaction Between the Declarant and the Law Enforcement Agents 
and Extent of Structure and Formality of Questioning 
Another factor that courts have considered in their application of Crawford is 
whether questioning of the declarant by law enforcement agents is structured and 
formal.114  In most cases dealing with this factor, the location of the questioning is a 
consideration in the court’s analysis.  If the questions are informal and unstructured, 
the courts are more inclined to characterize any statements procured from such 
questions as nontestimonial.  This situation arises if the questioning takes place at the 
scene of the incident itself or at a location other than the police station, such as a 
hospital. 
Other courts have placed more emphasis on whether the questioning is structured 
and formal and less emphasis on the location.115  In these cases, the courts seem 
concerned with the fact that a governmental authority is procuring information 
through direct questions, even if the questions are few in number and asked at the 
scene of the incident.116  The courts have held that statements generated under such 
circumstances, even if admissible as excited utterances, may implicate the 
Confrontation Clause under Crawford.117 
In People v. Cage,118 the California Court of Appeals had to evaluate three 
different hearsay statements from the victim, who had sustained a cut on his neck 
during a fight with the defendant (his mother).  The victim stated that his mother had 
slashed him with a piece of glass.  He made this statement to a police officer at the 
                                                                
114This factor is derived from the language in the Crawford decision where the Court 
discussed testimonial statements coming in the form of “custodial examinations” and a 
declarant “mak[ing] a formal statement to government officers.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
115See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text. 
116See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005) (“[S]tatements 
made in response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se testimonial, except 
when the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide 
medical care.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006); Watson, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 
(whether questioning constitutes interrogation is not determined by the number of questions 
asked by a police officer or law enforcement agent); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 836 
N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (applying the “per se” rule announced in 
Gonsalves). 
117See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing view that the 
excited nature of the utterance is secondary to the declarant’s objectively reasonable 
expectations of whether the statement would be used prosecutorally), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
2983 (2006); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 811 (arguing against the “unwarranted and unduly 
restrictive” distinction “between statements made in formalized testimonial settings versus 
informal investigative settings”). 
118People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review granted, 
99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).  The California Supreme Court has ordered supplemental briefing in the 
matter so that the parties can address the effect of Davis on the issues presented in Cage.  
People v. Cage, No. S127344, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8013 (Cal. June 28, 2006). 
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hospital, to a doctor at the hospital, and to the same police officer at the police 
station.119  The trial court admitted the statements under the California Evidence 
Code as both spontaneous statements and a victim’s report of a physical injury.120 
The court in Cage held that the statement to the doctor at the hospital was clearly 
nontestimonial and that the statement to the police officer at the police station was 
clearly testimonial.121  On the statement to the police officer at the hospital, the court 
held that the statement was not testimonial “because the interview was not 
sufficiently analogous to a pretrial examination by a justice of the peace; among 
other things, the police had not yet focused on a crime or a suspect, there was no 
structured questioning, and the interview was informal and unrecorded.”122 
The lack of formality and structure in the manner of questioning, in addition to 
the fact that it took place at a hospital and not in a courtroom or station house, 
persuaded the court in Cage that the interview was not an interrogation.123  
Therefore, the statement was admissible as a spontaneous or excited utterance and 
was not testimonial under Crawford.124 
In contrast to the holding in Cage, the court in Wall v. State125 held that a police 
interview of a witness at a hospital was structured questioning.126  In Wall, one of the 
victims of an assault provided a statement to the police detailing how the defendant 
had made several racial epithets and then attacked his victims with a wooden 
board.127  When the victim was unavailable to testify at trial, a deputy testified as to 
what the victim had told him in response to the deputy’s questioning at the 
hospital.128  The trial court admitted the victim’s statements as excited utterances, 
and the defendant challenged the admission of the statements as a violation of his 
right to confront the witnesses against him.129 
The issue on appeal was “whether a non-testifying witness’s statement made to a 
police officer during investigation of a crime and incriminating the defendant, is 
                                                                
119Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848. 
120Id. at 850. 
121Id. at 848.  The victim’s statement to the police officer at the police station was a 
recorded station-house interview identical to the one at issue in Crawford, and the statement to 
the doctor was not made to the police or an agent of the police.  Id. at 854-55.  
122Id. at 848; see also Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding 
that victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and 
victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005). 
123Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856-57. 
124Id. at 857. 
125Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d, 184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2006). 
126Id. at 851. 
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admissible against the defendant.”130  In reliance on the standard for interrogation 
from Crawford as a statement “knowingly given in response to structured police 
questioning,” the court in Wall held that an interview of a witness at a hospital is 
“structured police questioning” and, therefore, an interrogation under Crawford.131  
The victim’s statement was held to be “testimonial” under the standard in 
Crawford.132 
It is difficult to distinguish Cage and Wall from each other on their facts.  
Perhaps one difference is that in Cage, the law enforcement agent was still trying to 
determine whether a crime had been committed at the time he conducted the 
interview.133  The court in Cage stated that the deputy engaged in no structured 
questioning but simply extended “an open-ended invitation for [the victim] to tell his 
story.”134  In Wall, however, the deputy’s questioning of the victim was more 
specifically related to the investigation of a crime.135  The cases clearly illustrate the 
difficulty that courts have encountered in the application of Crawford in this context. 
That application, however, may become somewhat less difficult in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington.136  In Davis, the Court 
distinguished between interrogations that occur during an ongoing emergency and 
interrogations that occur when the emergency has ceased.137  Thus, even if the 
interview in Cage was informal and unrecorded, the fact that the police were asking 
questions some time after the incident in an effort to establish past events would 
seem to make the victim’s statement to the police testimonial under Davis.  The 
                                                                
130Id. at 849. 
131Id. at 851. 
132Id.  Applying the standard of an “objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes 
of the actual declarant[,]” the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a reasonable person 
would have realized that the officers were investigating a criminal occurrence and were 
gathering evidence for a prosecution.  Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-45 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2006).  The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, agreed with the Court of Appeals that 
admission of the statement violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
at 745.  The Court of Criminal Appeals also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the 
erroneous admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it did 
not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 745-46.  The Court of Criminal Appeals 
remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the confrontation 
violation was harmful during the punishment stage of the proceeding.  Id. at 746-47.   
The holding of the Texas Court of Appeals in Wall is also in stark contrast to its holding in 
Cassidy.  See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that 
victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and that 
victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005); see also Tyler v. State, 167 S.W.3d 550, 553-54 (Tex. App. 
2005) (pointing out apparent conflict between Wall and Cassidy). 
133People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review 
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
134Id. at 856-57. 
135Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 848, 851. 
136Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
137Id. at 2273-74. 
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Supreme Court of California will reconsider the result in Cage in light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis.138 
A statement would seem to qualify as testimonial under Davis if it is made in 
response to any police questioning that occurs after the threatening incident is no 
longer in progress,139 even if the questioning takes place at the scene of the incident 
itself and elicits a statement that qualifies as an excited utterance under state 
evidentiary law. The Supreme Court deemphasized the requirement that the 
questioning be formal and structured in its decision in Davis,140 which was a point of 
emphasis for several courts in the immediate aftermath of Crawford.  
For example, in United States v. Webb,141 the police officer conducted the 
questioning right at the scene.  In Webb, the court held that statements made in 
response to investigatory questioning at the scene of a criminal event soon after the 
occurrence of the criminal event were not made in response to police interrogation as 
contemplated by Crawford.142  In Webb, a police officer arrived on the scene of an 
assault and asked the victim, “What happened?”143  The victim responded, “[the 
defendant] punched me with a closed fist two times in the face.”144  When the police 
officer asked her why, the victim responded that she had refused to give the 
defendant money for drugs and that the two had gotten into an argument as a 
result.145 
The court in Webb reasoned that the police officer’s main concern in asking the 
questions was to investigate the situation and to ascertain what had happened.146  In 
addition, “[t]he situation did not resemble a formal police investigation at a police 
station.”147  Therefore, the victim’s statements were admitted as excited utterances.148 
                                                                
138People v. Cage, No. S127344, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8013 (Cal. June 28, 2006) (ordering the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Davis on the issues presented in 
the case). 
139See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79. 
140The Court in Davis did not entirely reject the notion that the degree of formality of the 
statement is an important consideration in the determination of whether the statement is 
testimonial.  Id. at 2278 n.5.  The Court did, however, characterize the distinction between 
“formal” and “informal” statements as “vague.”  Id. 
141United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 
2004). 
142Id. at *3. 
143Id. at *1. 
144Id. 
145Id. 
146Id. at *3. 
147Id. at *4. 
148Id. at *4-5; see also Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 351, 353-54 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that injured man’s response to police officer’s question, “What happened?”, 
was not testimonial under Crawford because it was not given in response to interrogation), 
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding case to the Court of 
Appeals of Alaska for further consideration in light of Davis). 
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In two cases decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals, statements by a domestic 
violence victim to a police officer were held to be nontestimonial because of the 
informal nature of the questioning.  In Fowler v. State,149 the court held that a 
domestic assault victim’s statement to a police officer, who asked the victim what 
had happened ten minutes after arriving at the residence in response to a 911 call, 
was not a testimonial statement and was therefore admissible under Crawford.150  
The victim responded that her husband, the defendant, “had punched her several 
times in the face.”151  Despite the lapse of time between the police officer’s arrival 
and the victim’s statement, the court in Fowler concluded that the victim’s statement 
was an excited utterance.152 
On the issue of admissibility of the statement under Crawford, the court in 
Fowler held “that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a 
request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately 
thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response 
thereto are not ‘testimonial.’”153  The court emphasized that the investigation was 
still in a preliminary stage and that the police were asking questions at the scene of 
the incident shortly after it occurred.154 
In a concurring opinion in Fowler, Judge Crone took the position that Crawford 
did not apply to the facts of the case.155  Judge Crone stated that although the 
domestic assault victim in the case had been uncooperative, she testified at trial and 
was therefore subject to cross-examination regarding the statements that she made to 
the police at the scene.156  Judge Crone concluded his concurring opinion with the 
following statement: “The fallout from Justice Scalia’s ‘clarification’ of the 
Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate through the evidentiary landscape 
for some time to come and will create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate 
courts . . . .” 157 
                                                                
149Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006). 
150Id. at 961, 964. 
151Id. at 961. 
152Id. at 962. 
153Id. at 964. 
154Id.  On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding that [the 
victim’s] account [of the assault to the police] was testimonial.”  Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 
459, 464 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006).  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that the statement was properly admitted and affirmed the defendant’s conviction on the 
ground that the victim had appeared at trial and was subject to cross-examination.  Id. at 464-
66.  Under the standard announced in Davis, the Indiana Supreme Court was correct that the 
victim’s account was testimonial because the “primary purpose” of the police questioning was 
to establish the prior criminal incident, which was no longer ongoing at that point.  See Davis 
v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
155Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 965 (Crone, J., concurring). 
156Id. at 966.  The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Justice Crone’s position that the 
victim’s appearance at trial satisfied the Confrontation Clause.  See Fowler, 829 N.E.2d at 
464-65. 
157Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 966 (Crone, J., concurring). 
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Similarly, in Hammon v. State,158 which the Supreme Court reversed as the 
companion case to Davis v. Washington,159 the court held that statements made by a 
domestic violence victim to an investigating officer were not testimonial under 
Crawford.160  The victim’s statements were admissible as excited utterances because 
the victim made the statements to the police after a startling event that had recently 
taken place.161  Even though the victim gave her statement in direct response to 
police questioning, it was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford.162  Using 
some of the language from Fowler, the court in Hammon reasoned as follows: 
 We thus hold that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in 
response to a request for assistance and begin informally questioning 
those nearby immediately thereafter in order to determine what has 
happened, statements given in response thereto are not “testimonial.”  
Whatever else police “interrogation” might be, we do not believe that 
word applies to preliminary investigatory questions asked at the scene of a 
crime shortly after it has occurred.  Such interaction with witnesses on the 
scene does not fit within a lay conception of police “interrogation,” 
bolstered by television, as encompassing an “interview” in a room at the 
stationhouse. It also does not bear the hallmarks of an improper  
“inquisitorial practice.”163 
The courts in Webb, Fowler and Hammon separated the police activity into two 
distinct stages: the initial determination of what actually occurred, and if the 
occurrence constituted a crime, the investigation of the crime itself.  These courts 
reasoned that any answers to police questioning during the former stage were 
nontestimonial statements because the Court in Crawford emphasized the importance 
of “formal statement[s] to government officers”164 and described the “striking 
resemblance [between police interrogations and] examinations by justices of the 
                                                                
158Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
159Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-80. 
160Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952. 
161Id. at 948-49. 
162Id. at 952. 
163Id.; see also People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that preliminary questions asked at the crime scene shortly after the crime occurred constituted 
an “unstructured interaction” between the officer and the witness and not an interrogation); 
State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005) (holding that police who ask preliminary 
questions to ascertain the level of danger when responding to emergency calls are not 
gathering information to make a case against a suspect), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006).  
The Indiana Supreme Court in Hammon agreed with the Court of Appeals that responses to 
initial inquiries at a crime scene typically would not qualify as testimonial statements.  
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 
S. Ct. 2266 (2006).  The Indiana Supreme Court declined to adopt the view, however, that 
excited utterances are per se nontestimonial.  Id. 
164Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
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peace in England[,]” in the 16th and 17th centuries.165  If the police ask questions 
during the former stage, any answers to those questions constitute statements that are 
not testimonial.  When the police possess little or no information about a particular 
occurrence, it follows that they will not be able to ask questions that are formal and 
structured as contemplated by Crawford.166  Responses to the more detailed 
questions asked during the investigatory stage, however, produce testimonial 
statements that are subject to the rule of Crawford. 
Under Davis v. Washington, police questioning at either stage will produce 
testimonial statements so long as the criminal incident is not ongoing and the 
“primary purpose” of the questioning is to establish the prior incident in a way that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.167  The degree of formality is 
still a consideration in the determination of whether a statement is testimonial,168 but 
the Court in Davis seemed to break from the rationale of Crawford when it stated 
that “[i]t imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are 
criminal offenses.”169 
An illustration of this two stage procedure that appears to be consistent with the 
distinction made in Davis (between statements to meet an emergency—which are 
nontestimonial—and statements to establish a past event—which are testimonial) is 
evidenced in Stancil v. United States.170  In Stancil, the evidence against the 
defendant consisted solely of the testimony of a police officer who appeared at the 
home of the defendant and his wife in response to a 911 call.  The police officer 
testified to certain statements that the defendant’s wife had made to him shortly after 
the police arrived on the scene.171  The trial judge allowed the statements to be 
admitted as excited utterances.172  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
statements were testimonial under Crawford and should have been excluded because 
he had not cross-examined them.173  
                                                                
165Id. at 52. 
166See also People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
2004) (finding that victim’s excited utterance was not testimonial because victim was 
seriously injured when police found him and that the question of “What happened?” did not 
constitute an interrogation when victim responded that a person named Rick had shot him), 
remanded, 722 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2006) (remanding to court of appeals for reconsideration 
in light of Davis in lieu of granting leave to appeal). 
167Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
168Id. at 2278 n.5. 
169Id.  As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the possibility of criminal proceedings 
being brought against a person who makes a false oral statement to a police officer “may 
render honesty in casual conversations with police officers important.  It does not, however, 
render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.”  Id. at 
2283 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
170Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 878 A.2d 
1186 (D.C. 2005). 
171Id. at 801. 
172Id. at 801-02. 
173Id. at 802. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
580 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:559 
The court in Stancil remanded the case for additional findings on whether the 
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated.174  The court 
reasoned that the activities of the police at the apartment during the investigation of 
the 911 call were divided into two distinct stages.175  Statements by the defendant’s 
wife to the police during the first stage, before the police had restored order and 
began asking questions, were not testimonial and could be admitted as evidence 
under the excited utterance exception.176  Statements made by the defendant’s wife to 
the police after the police had secured the scene, statements that were in response to 
questions that the police asked her, took on a “testimonial character” and would 
ordinarily be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.177  The court in Stancil 
stated that the types of statements cited by the Court in Crawford as testimonial “all 
involve a declarant’s knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative 
environment.”178  The “investigative environment, however, could be a home or a 
hotel room under the right circumstances.”179 
In People v. Watson,180 the court had to determine whether a series of statements 
were testimonial under Crawford when made by an employee of a Burger King 
Restaurant immediately following a robbery of the restaurant.181  Immediately after 
the police captured the suspects, the employee, who was bleeding profusely from an 
injury suffered during the robbery, stated to the police that the defendant “just 
robbed me.  He just robbed us in Burger King.”182  The police officer then asked the 
employee whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, and the 
employee responded that the defendant had acted alone.183  Finally, when the police 
officer asked the employee to describe what happened, the employee described the 
defendant’s actions in entering the Burger King Restaurant, revealing a gun and 
demanding money from the safe.184 
The employee made his second statement in response to a police question about 
whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, but it was not a 
structured question that was asked in anticipation of trial.185  Rather, the police 
wanted to secure the area where the robbery had occurred and determine whether 
they should search for other robbers in the vicinity.186  Therefore, this statement was 
                                                                
174Id. at 815. 
175Id. at 814. 
176Id. at 815. 
177Id. at 813, 815. 
178Id. at 812. 
179Id. at 812 n.25. 
180People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004). 
181Id. at *1-2, *13-15. 
182Id. at *2. 
183Id. 
184Id. 
185Id. at *14. 
186Id. 
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not testimonial and could be introduced at the defendant’s trial without violating 
Crawford.187 
The employee’s final statement, however, was made in response to structured 
questioning by the police.188  When the police asked the employee what had 
happened, they had already placed the defendant in custody and were trying to obtain 
information to further their investigation and eventual prosecution of the 
defendant.189  Given the circumstances that existed at the time of the questioning, the 
employee should have been aware that the information would be used at future 
judicial proceedings.190  Therefore, the court in Watson concluded that the 
employee’s third statement was testimonial in nature and could not be introduced 
against the defendant at trial because it was not subject to cross-examination.191  The 
court rejected the argument that no interrogation had taken place because the police 
had asked only two questions: 
Interrogation, even as that term is used in the colloquial sense, is not 
determined by the number of questions asked.  When a police officer or 
any other law enforcement agent questions a potential witness for the 
purpose of gathering information to aid in a suspect’s prosecution, and the 
witness is aware of the purpose of the officer’s questions, structured 
questioning amounting to an interrogation has occurred.  That the officer 
obtained all of the pertinent information from a single question is of no 
moment.192 
The court in Watson permitted the police to determine what actually occurred 
without excluding the statements made by the employee in the course of that process.  
Once the police determined what had happened at the restaurant, however, the court 
characterized as “interrogation” any questions that followed.  Law enforcement 
agents, therefore, are capable of producing both testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements within a short period of time from the same witness.  Moreover, it is not 
always possible to draw a precise line of demarcation between the police officers’ act 
of responding to an emergency and the act of gathering evidence for the subsequent 
prosecution.193  
                                                                
187Id. 
188Id. at *15. 
189Id. 
190Id. at *15. 
191Id. 
192Id.  This analysis illustrates how the above-stated factors work together in adjudicating 
the issue of whether a particular statement is testimonial.  The Watson court’s conclusion that 
the police were engaging in structured questioning, an interrogation, followed directly from its 
conclusion that the police were gathering evidence for a future prosecution.  See infra notes 
292-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of statements to be used as evidence in a 
future prosecution. 
193Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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In People v. Victors,194 the defendant was charged with domestic battery.  A 
couple in an adjoining room, the Doerrs, heard “slapping-type” and “thumping” 
noises coming from the room in which the defendant and the victim were staying.195  
The Doerrs also heard the defendant speak in a loud, angry voice and call the victim 
an offensive name.196  When the Doerrs heard the victim tell the defendant to stop, 
Mr. Doerr called the police and spoke to them upon their arrival.197  
One of the officers on the scene spoke to the victim.198  The victim informed the 
officer that she and the defendant had an argument, and the argument escalated into 
the defendant pushing her, pulling her hair, punching her and choking her.199  At 
trial, the State sought to have the officer testify about what the victim had told him 
because the victim did not testify.200  The trial court admitted the victim’s statements 
as excited utterances.201 
The court in Victors rejected the claim that the victim’s statements to the police 
officers constituted excited utterances and held that the admission of the police 
officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s statements to him violated the rule 
announced in Crawford.202  The court reasoned that the victim made the statements 
to the police in response to their questions while they were investigating a possible 
crime.203  Because the police officer’s testimony was offered to establish an element 
of the crime with which the defendant had been charged, it constituted testimonial 
evidence under Crawford.204  The Victors case is another example of the distinction 
between the initial determination by the police of what actually occurred and police 
investigation of the crime itself.  By distinguishing between the initial police 
response to the incident and the subsequent police investigation of the incident, the 
court in Victors correctly anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Malley disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that the victim’s statements were not excited utterances.205  On whether 
                                                                
194People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), appeal denied, 830 N.E.2d 8 
(Ill. 2005). 




199Id. at 314. 
200Id. 
201Id. at 315. 
202Id. at 320.  In ruling that the statements were not excited utterances, the court in Victors 
did not specify the evidentiary rule that would provide for the admission of the statements.  
See infra note 205. 
203Victors, 819 N.E.2d at 320. 
204Id. at 320-21. 
205Id. at 321 (O’Malley, J., concurring).  Justice O’Malley also took issue with the 
majority’s decision to reach the federal Confrontation Clause issue under Crawford when it 
had already decided that the statement was excluded on evidentiary grounds under Illinois 
state law.  Id. at 323. 
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the victim’s statements were testimonial under Crawford, Justice O’Malley stated the 
following: 
With the ink hardly dry on Crawford’s Copernican shift in federal 
constitutional law, a panel of the Illinois Appellate Court plummets 
undaunted, but for no good reason, into the murky waters left in 
Crawford’s wake.  In its zeal, the majority stretches the definition of 
“testimonial” to unprecedented girth in Illinois.206 
Because the victim gave her statement to the police in an informal setting without 
any structured questioning and only minutes after the incident had occurred, 
reasoned Justice O’Malley, the victim’s statement was not testimonial under 
Crawford.207  It is another example of the uncertainty involved in trying to identify 
the precise point in time when the police have ceased to respond to the incident and 
have begun to gather evidence. 
In Samarron v. State,208 the declarant was standing among a group of men who 
were approached by a second group of men.  A man in the second group stabbed Mr. 
Villatoro, who was in the declarant’s group, and another man from the second group 
hit Mr. Villatoro over the head with a hammer.209  Mr. Villatoro died from his 
injuries, and the declarant gave a statement to the police one hour after the 
incident.210  Based on the declarant’s statement, the police were able to identify the 
defendant as the man who had stabbed Mr. Villatoro.211  The declarant did not testify 
at trial, and his statement was admitted as an excited utterance.212 
The court in Samarron held that the admission of the declarant’s statement 
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the statement 
was testimonial.213  The declarant had not spontaneously provided his statement to 
                                                                
206Id. at 323. 
207Id. at 324.  In Justice O’Malley’s view, the police were still trying to determine exactly 
what had happened when they spoke to the victim.  Id.  When asked how he conducted the 
questioning of the victim, the police officer testified, “I asked her basically . . . what was 
happening.”  Id.; see also State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding 
that victim’s excited utterance to police, which was obtained in response to questioning, was 
not testimonial because police did not know that a crime had been committed when they spoke 
to victim and were still trying to ascertain what had happened), petition for review granted in 
part, No. CR-05-0104-PR, 2005 Ariz. LEXIS 127 (Ariz. 2005), and remanded by No. CR-05-
0104-PR, 2006 Ariz. LEXIS 96 (Ariz. 2006), vacated in part and aff’d, 143 P.3d 668 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2006). On remand from the Arizona Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of 
Davis, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the victim gave his statement to 
the police during an ongoing emergency in order to obtain medical assistance for his serious 
injuries, and that the officer’s purpose in asking the victim “what happened?” was to assist the 
victim and to meet the emergency.  Alvarez, 143 P.3d at 674.  
208Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).   
209Id. at 702. 
210Id. at 703. 
211Id. 
212Id. 
213Id. at 706. 
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the police.214  It was a formal, signed, written statement given in response to 
questions from the police.215  The admission of the statement violated the defendant’s 
right to confront the witnesses against him because he had no opportunity to cross 
examine it.216  Because the statement was in writing, it was the “functional 
equivalent” of “ex parte in-court testimony” discussed in Crawford.217 
Under Crawford, informal questioning and gathering of information from 
witnesses and victims at the scene of a crime produced nontestimonial statements 
that could be used against a defendant at a subsequent prosecution without violating 
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.  Under Davis, the emphasis is more on 
the timing of the questioning than on the formality of it.  Therefore, police 
questioning of witnesses and victims at the scene of an incident that takes place after 
the police have neutralized any danger at the scene will produce testimonial 
statements.218  Informal, unstructured questioning designed to ascertain what 
happened or to address an ongoing incident does not constitute an interrogation as 
defined in Crawford,219 and this analysis is still valid after Davis.  When the 
questioning becomes more structured and organized, with the information gathered 
from it to be used in a future prosecution, such use violates the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights unless he or she has the opportunity to cross-examine 
the statements.  The questioning is likely to become more structured and organized 
when the police determine that a crime has been committed and are seeking to learn 
the identity of the perpetrator or the manner of its commission. 
Although some cases place significance on the location of the questioning, with a 
hospital deemed to be a less formal atmosphere than a police station,220 the court in 
Stancil v. United States221 stated that a home or hotel room could constitute an 
“investigative environment” under the right circumstances.  In addition, the court in 
People v. Watson222 concluded that even two questions can constitute structured 
questioning if law enforcement personnel have placed the suspect in custody prior to 
                                                                
214Id. at 707. 
215Id. 
216Id. 
217Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  
218Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
219See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 562-63 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., 
concurring in part) (“‘[P]olice interrogation’ does not encompass the basic, immediate, on-
scene questioning of persons present in an attempt to get the gist of what is happening or has 
just happened, i.e., to ascertain why police were called to the scene and what steps need to be 
taken in response.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).  
220See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
925 (2005); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review 
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
221Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 812 n.25 (D.C. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 
878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005). 
222People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 
2004). 
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asking the questions.  When the witness’s statement is written223 or recorded,224 it is 
likely that such a statement will meet the standard for testimonial material under 
Crawford because the statement is very similar to in-court testimony. 
C.  Purpose of the Statement 
In the analysis of whether the rule announced in Crawford applies to a particular 
statement, courts have also examined the declarant’s purpose for making the 
statement.  In some cases, the declarant’s primary motivation is to obtain protection 
from danger or to be rescued from a dangerous situation.225  In such cases, courts 
have usually held the statement to be nontestimonial.226  If, on the other hand, the 
declarant makes the statement to provide information for a possible future legal 
proceeding, the courts have held such statements to be testimonial.227  It can be a 
difficult task for courts to distinguish between these different kinds of statements.228  
As is the case with all of the factors, the outcome of these cases is often determined 
by which factor is most prevalent in a given situation. 
Emergency 911 calls have been placed in both categories.  A nontestimonial plea 
for help and protection229 may become a testimonial report of a crime that can be 
used at a future judicial proceeding if the caller makes a specific accusation.230  The 
caller may make such an accusation voluntarily or in response to questions from the 
911 operator.231   
The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed the validity of the distinction 
between statements that are made to obtain protection and statements that are made 
to provide incriminating evidence for Confrontation Clause analysis.232  The Court in 
                                                                
223See Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 706-07 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
224A recorded statement may not qualify as an excited utterance in most circumstances 
because it is likely that such a statement would be obtained at a point when the declarant is no 
longer under the stress of the exciting event.  If the statement was admissible as an excited 
utterance, however, the degree of formality and structure involved in procuring the statement 
would qualify it as testimonial under Crawford. 
225The declarants in these cases are usually the victims of the crimes. 
226See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, statements 
made to police while the declarant or others are still in personal danger cannot be said to have 
been made with consideration of their legal ramifications . . . [T]herefore, . . . such statements 
will not normally be deemed testimonial.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006). 
227Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (explaining that “‘pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorally’” are part of the core class 
of testimonial statements (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23)).   
228White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in 
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a 
multitude of difficulties.”). 
229See infra notes 237-65 and accompanying text. 
230See infra notes 307-15 and accompanying text. 
231See infra notes 329-38 and accompanying text. 
232See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
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Davis stated that if the purpose of the police interrogation is to respond to an 
emergency, statements made in the course of the interrogation are nontestimonial.233  
Conversely, if the purpose of the police interrogation is to establish the occurrence of 
an event in anticipation of a future prosecution, statements made in the course of the 
interrogation are testimonial.234  The Court in Davis described the distinction in terms 
of the interrogation and not the statements themselves because interrogation had 
produced the statements in the cases before them.235  The Court made clear that 
“even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, 
not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to 
evaluate.”236 
Thus, courts that made the distinction between these two kinds of statements in 
the immediate aftermath of Crawford correctly anticipated the Court’s clarification 
of Crawford in Davis.  An examination of these cases illustrates that even with the 
Davis decision as a guide, the distinction is not always a clear one. 
1.  Statements to Obtain Aid or to Reduce the Level of Danger 
In People v. Moscat,237 the prosecution sought to introduce as evidence at trial a 
recording of a 911 call.238  The court allowed the recording to be admitted as 
evidence because it was not “testimonial” as that term is explained in Crawford.239 
The Moscat court pointed out that 911 calls are among the most common form of 
evidence in domestic violence cases.240  The court explained that, prior to Crawford, 
it was fairly clear that the admission of 911 calls as excited utterances was not a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.241  The Moscat court then 
concluded that “[a] 911 call for help is essentially different in nature than the 
‘testimonial’ materials that Crawford tells us the Confrontation Clause was designed 
to exclude.”242  The victim usually generates these calls out of desire to be rescued 
and protected from danger.243  In addition, the 911 call is not the equivalent of a 
formal pretrial examination but rather the “electronically augmented equivalent of a 
                                                                
233Id. at 2273. 
234Id. at 2273-74. 
235Id. at 2274 n.1. 
236Id.  
237People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
238Id. at 875. 
239Id. at 876. 
240Id. at 878. 
241Id. 
242Id. at 879. 
243Id.  
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
2006] TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS, EXCITED UTTERANCES 587 
loud cry for help.”244  Lastly, the 911 call is part of the criminal incident itself and 
not part of the prosecution that follows.245 
In People v. Conyers,246 the prosecution sought to introduce two 911 calls made 
within minutes of each other by a third party who had witnessed the defendant’s 
alleged assault of the victim.247  In the first call, the witness screamed for police 
assistance to stop a fight between her son and son-in-law.248  In the second call, the 
witness screamed for an ambulance.249  The prosecution sought to introduce both 
calls as excited utterances.250 
The Conyers court concluded that neither call was testimonial.251  The court 
reasoned that the witness made the calls as she was reacting to the serious situation 
that was happening right in front of her.252  Her intention in making the call was to 
stop the assault that was in progress and not to consider the legal consequences of 
being a witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.253  Because the statements were 
not testimonial, their introduction at the defendant’s trial did not violate his Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford.254 
                                                                
244Id. at 880. 
245Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 2006) (applying Davis 
and holding that domestic assault victim’s statements to 911 dispatcher were admissible 
because the purpose of the statements was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing 
emergency).  But see Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1193-1200 (2002) (arguing that participants in the violence that results in 
911 calls are aware that statements made in such calls are likely to result in arrest and 
prosecution and to be used as evidence against the defendant at trial).  See generally David 
Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic Violence 
Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995 (2005) (discussing 
discrepancies between the actual circumstances of the 911 call in Moscat and the facts recited 
in the decision); Lininger, supra note 61, at 774, n.136 (pointing out that the Moscat court 
incorrectly recited several of the facts in the case and that the prosecution eventually declined 
to pursue the case because of problems with the evidence). 
246People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 




251Id. at 277. 
252Id. at 276-77. 
253Id. at 277. 
254Id.  On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court agreed that the 
911 calls were not testimonial in light of Davis because “the objective circumstances 
indicate[d] that the primary purpose of the police questioning during the call was to enable 
assistance during an ongoing emergency, rather than to establish some past fact.”  People v. 
Conyers, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. 
Ct. 2266, 2276-77 (2006)); see also People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005) (determining that a brief description of an attack in progress in a 911 call was not 
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Similarly, the issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
in United States v. Brito255 was whether and under what circumstances an excited 
utterance in a 911 call should be considered testimonial.256  In Brito, an anonymous 
911 caller engaged in a dialogue with the 911 operator, stating that she had heard a 
gunshot, describing the suspect’s appearance and location and telling the operator 
that the suspect had a handgun.257  During the trial, the prosecution sought to 
introduce the tape of the 911 call as evidence.258  Except for the caller’s description 
of the pistol, the court admitted the 911 tape as an excited utterance.259 
On appeal, the defendant asserted that admission of the redacted version of the 
911 tape violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the speaker.260  The 
defendant’s first argument was that an objectively reasonable caller would have 
understood that the statements given during the call would be available for use at a 
subsequent prosecution.261  Second, the defendant contended that the statements 
given after the questions posed by the 911 operator were the product of police 
interrogation.262 
After reviewing the three formulations of testimonial statements in Crawford and 
the court decisions interpreting those formulations, the Brito court held that the 911 
caller’s primary motivation was to neutralize the imminent danger that she faced 
from the suspect and to obtain a prompt response from law enforcement.263  For that 
reason, the caller lacked the “capacity to appreciate the potential long-range use of 
her words,” making the call nontestimonial and admissible as an excited utterance.264  
The questions from the 911 operator served to clarify and focus the caller’s statement 
and were not interrogation.265 
Victims also make statements with the primary purpose of escaping danger and 
directing law enforcement agents to the scene of the incident.  In State v. Maclin,266 
two police officers arrived at the victim’s home as a result of a 911 hangup call.267  
                                                          
testimonial because the caller’s purpose was to obtain police intervention), leave to appeal 
denied, 836 N.E.2d 1157 (N.Y. 2005). 
255United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006). 
256Id. at 55-56. 
257Id. at 56. 
258Id. at 57.   
259Id. at 57-58.   
260Id. at 58. 
261Id. at 59. 
262Id. 
263Id. at 59-62. 
264Id. at 63. 
265Id.  
266State v. Maclin, No. W2003-03123-CCA-R3-DC, 2005 WL 313977 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Feb. 9, 2005), rev’d, 183 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006). 
267Id. at *2. 
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Upon entering the house, the officers saw the defendant and the victim, who had 
swelling and bruises on her face.268  The victim told one of the officers that she and 
the defendant had gotten into an argument on the way home from work and that the 
defendant had pulled out a gun, pointed it at her head and threatened to kill her if she 
did not shut up.269  The defendant also threatened to kill the victim’s children.270  The 
victim explained to the officer that the defendant had hit her in the face with his 
hands.271 
The Maclin court concluded that the victim’s statements to the police officer 
were nontestimonial under Crawford.272  The victim, who feared for her safety, 
summoned the police to her home and spoke to the police when they arrived there.273  
The police did not obtain the statement through interrogation.274  Therefore, the 
police officer’s testimony about those statements did not violate the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.275 
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and held that the victim’s 
statements to the police were testimonial.276  The Maclin court anticipated the United 
States Supreme Court’s rationale in Davis v. Washington,277 reasoning that the arrival 
of the police neutralized any immediate danger faced by the victim.278  In addition, 
because the victim gave such an extraordinarily detailed statement to the police, she 
should have reasonably expected that the statement would be used prosecutorially.279  
Even though the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the Tennessee Court of 





272Id. at *16-17. 
273Id. at *17.  In this way, the victim also initiated the contact or interaction with the 
police.  See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text. 
274Maclin, 2005 WL 313977, at *17. 
275Id.; see also United States v. Griggs, No. 04 CR. 425(RWS), 2004 WL 2676474 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2004) (permitting police officer to testify at trial that, upon arriving on the 
scene, he heard the statement, “Gun! Gun!  He’s got a gun!,” and then saw the declarant 
gesture at the defendant because the statement was not testimonial under Crawford). 
276State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 352 (Tenn. 2006). 
277The United States Supreme Court decided Davis five months after the Tennessee 
Supreme Court’s decision in Maclin. 
278Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 352. 
279Id.  The Court reached this conclusion by applying the third definition of testimonial 
from Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).  It is interesting to note that the police 
in Maclin were dispatched to the residence of the victim and the defendant based on a 911 
hang-up call.  Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 339.  Assuming that the victim made the call, if she had 
stayed on the line and described the defendant’s attack on her as it was happening, her 
statement would have been nontestimonial and, therefore, admissible under the standard 
established in Davis five months later.  See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 
2276-77 (2006). 
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Criminal Appeals that the officers’ general questioning at the scene did not constitute 
police interrogation, the Tennessee Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion 
on whether the victim’s statement was testimonial.280  The different results reached 
by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
Maclin clearly illustrate the difficulty that courts face in trying to characterize police 
conduct as either responding to an emergency or gathering evidence for a future 
prosecution.281 
In Key v. State,282 a police officer who answered a disturbance call found the 
defendant and the victim outside on the ground in an argument.283  The victim told 
the officer that the defendant had restrained her since seven o’clock that morning, 
that she had just run from the house and that the defendant had grabbed her and 
pulled her to the ground.284 
The Key court concluded that, by responding to the disturbance, the police officer 
was not producing evidence for a potential criminal prosecution (which is one of the 
situations discussed in Crawford).285  Rather, the officer was securing the scene and 
assessing the situation.286  The court held that the underlying rationale of the excited 
utterance exception supported the conclusion that the victim’s statements were not 
testimonial.287 
The cases reveal a willingness on the part of the courts to analyze these quickly 
developing situations at each stage in order to determine whether any statements 
implicate the Crawford doctrine.  In Moscat,288 Conyers289 and Brito,290 the courts 
agreed that the admission of statements made during 911 calls did not violate the 
                                                                
280Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 352. 
281See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that most police responses to reports of crimes “are both to respond 
to the emergency and to gather evidence”) (emphasis in original). 
282Key v. State, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). 
283Id. at 73. 
284Id. 
285Id. at 76. 
286Id.; see also Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 814-15 (D.C. 2005) (holding that 
statements made by the victim to the police when the police first arrived at the scene of a 
domestic disturbance were not testimonial because order had not yet been restored), reh’g en 
banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005).  But see Commonwealth v. Young, No. 0313 CR 
5855 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Lynn May 7, 2004) (holding that victim’s statement to police officer 
upon his arrival at the scene that her husband had hit her in the face and chest, which qualified 
as an excited utterance, was inadmissible at trial because of the defendant’s inability to cross-
examine the statement).  
287Key, 173 S.W.3d at 76-77.  
288People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
289People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301  
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
290United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006). 
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defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.291  The courts are reluctant, if not 
completely unwilling, to exclude a statement made for the purpose of obtaining aid 
or neutralizing a dangerous situation.  Courts that admit such statements now do so 
with assurance that they are correctly applying the rule laid out in Crawford, and 
clarified in Davis.  When the statements are made at the scene to law enforcement 
authorities, the analysis necessarily turns to the level of questioning by the 
authorities. 
2.  Statement as Evidence for Possible Future Prosecution or Other Legal 
Proceeding292 
If a declarant makes a statement to law enforcement agents in order to provide 
evidence against an accused for a possible future prosecution, the statement is 
testimonial.293  It is difficult to distinguish many of these statements from those that 
are made for the purpose of obtaining aid.  As previously illustrated, many 
statements share characteristics that are common to both situations, and the 
distinguishing factor is often the manner of questioning by law enforcement agents.  
The court’s characterization of the statement will often depend upon which factor is 
most conspicuous in the particular fact pattern. 
An example of the difficulty in this area is Davis v. State,294 a case in which the 
defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.  When a 
neighbor heard screams coming from the house where the victim and the defendant 
lived together, she called 911 for police assistance.295  When the police arrived at the 
house, the victim ran across the street to the neighbor’s yard.296  At trial, the neighbor 
testified that the victim told her, “[h]e tried to kill me.”297 
                                                                
291The rationale in these decisions conflicts with the thesis of Professor Friedman and 
Professor McCormack regarding the awareness level of 911 callers.  See Friedman & 
McCormack, supra note 245; see also People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 415 (2004) (stating 
that purpose of a 911 call is to supply information for potential use at a subsequent 
prosecution); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 
purpose of victim’s 911 call was to report defendant’s violation of a protective order, which 
provided evidence for his prosecution).  Cortes is discussed infra at notes 329-38 and 
accompanying text, and Powers is discussed infra at notes 307-15 and accompanying text. 
292This factor is derived primarily from the third definition of “testimonial” in Crawford: 
“‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’”  Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3).  
293United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that excited 
utterances were testimonial statements where victim could reasonably expect that her 
statements would be used to prosecute the defendant), vacated on other grounds, 434 F.3d 396 
(6th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-5384, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4995 (6th Cir. 
Feb. 27, 2006). 
294Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 203 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2006).   
295Id. at 663. 
296Id. 
297Id. 
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One of the officers who responded to the 911 call testified that he followed the 
victim to the front porch of the neighbor’s house.298  The victim was crying, 
trembling and frightened, and she bore signs of injury on her body.299  The police 
officer testified as to what the victim had told him on the neighbor’s porch, which 
included the details of the defendant’s assault on her.300 
The defendant argued that the admission of the police officer’s testimony about 
what the victim had told him violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.301  In its analysis of whether the victim’s statement 
to the police officer was testimonial under Crawford, the Davis court stated that “[a] 
statement is more likely to be testimonial if the person who heard, recorded, and 
produced the out-of-court statement at trial is a government officer.”302  The court 
noted that simply because a statement qualifies as an excited utterance does not 
necessarily mean that “it is ipso facto nontestimonial hearsay outside the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause and admissible into evidence.  Each case must be examined on 
its facts to determine if the evidence is testimonial and controlled by Crawford.”303  
The victim’s statements to the police simultaneously served two objectives.  The first 
was to obtain assistance, and the second was to provide information for a possible 
future prosecution.304  
The Davis court conceded the difficulty in drawing the line between testimonial 
and nontestimonial hearsay under Crawford.305  Ultimately, the court did not make 
the determination and concluded that even if the victim’s statements were 
testimonial, the admission of the testimony constituted error that did not contribute to 
the conviction.306  The scenario in Davis precluded the court from characterizing the 
statement as either primarily a call for assistance—which would be a nontestimonial 
statement—or primarily the provision of information for a possible future 
prosecution—which would be a testimonial statement. 
                                                                
298Id. at 664. 
299Id.  
300Id. 
301Id. at 665.    
302Id. at 667. 
303Id. at 671. 
304Id. at 672. 
305Id. 
306Id. at 672-73.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction in Davis.  Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  The Court 
first held that the victim’s statements to the police were testimonial because they were “made 
in circumstances objectively indicating that the emergency was over and that the investigation 
had begun.”  Id. at 849 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006)).  The 
statements were, therefore, erroneously admitted under Crawford.  The Court also held, 
however, that any error caused by the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because of the volume of evidence at trial demonstrating that the defendant 
had attempted to strangle the victim.  Id. at 849-56. 
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In State v. Powers,307 the victim made a 911 call to the police to report that the 
defendant had been in her home, which was a violation of the no-contact order 
against the defendant.  In his appeal of the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant argued 
that the trial court’s admission of the 911 tape of the victim’s call violated his rights 
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.308 
The defendant argued that the victim’s call was testimonial as defined by the 
Court in Crawford because it constituted a pretrial statement that the victim would 
reasonably expect to be used in the subsequent prosecution.309  The defendant 
characterized the 911 operator as an “immediate conduit to the police” and argued 
that the victim was aware of this connection when she made the call.310  Also, 
because the victim was aware of the no-contact order, as she was named in it and 
spoke of it on the telephone, she would have been aware that her 911 call would 
result in the defendant’s arrest.311 
Based on its examination of the transcript of the 911 call, the Powers court 
concluded that the victim’s call was for the purpose of reporting a crime and not to 
get help or protection.312  Because the victim called 911 to report the defendant’s 
violation of the protective order and provided a description of him so that the 
authorities could apprehend and prosecute him, she did not call for protection and, 
therefore, her statements were testimonial under Crawford.313  The court rejected the 
State’s argument and refused to adopt a bright line rule that would admit all 911 
recordings into evidence.314  Thus, the victim’s awareness of the protective order 
allowed the court to conclude that the statement was primarily to provide evidence 
for a prosecution.315 
                                                                
307State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
308Id. at 1263. 
309Id. at 1263-64. 
310Id. at 1264; see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.2 (2006) (explaining 
that 911 operators act as agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 
callers). 
311Powers, 99 P.3d at 1264. 
312Id. at 1265. 
313Id. at 1266; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245. 
314Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266. 
315See also People v. Ruiz, No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that the victim’s statement to the police about the defendant threatening to kill her 
with a handgun was testimonial).  The victim’s statement in Ruiz was not an excited utterance, 
but the case illustrates the difficulty of dealing with dual-purpose statements.  Id. at *9.  Even 
though the victim was seeking aid and protection from the police, the court concluded that the 
victim was aware that her complaint to the police would result in the defendant’s arrest and 
prosecution because the conduct of which she complained was obviously illegal and highly 
dangerous.  Id. at *9. 
Similarly, a victim’s statements to police that were made contemporaneously with the 
defendant’s arrival on the scene were held to be both excited utterances and testimonial 
statements because the victim was the only witness to the incident and could reasonably 
expect that her statements would be used to prosecute the defendant.  United States v. Arnold, 
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In Lopez v. State,316 the court utilized a different rationale but reached the same 
conclusion as the court in Powers.  In Lopez, the police were investigating a reported 
kidnaping and assault when they encountered the alleged victim standing in the 
parking lot of an apartment complex.  The victim told the police that a man had 
abducted him in his own car at gunpoint, and he pointed to the defendant, who was 
standing a short distance away in the parking lot.317  The victim also told the police 
that the gun used in the abduction was in his car.318  The officers searched the car and 
found a loaded gun under the front passenger seat.319  When the officers questioned 
the defendant, he admitted that the gun belonged to him and that he had hidden it in 
the victim’s car when he saw the police officers.320 
The defendant’s position on appeal was that the trial court’s admission of the 
victim’s statements about the gun violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to 
confront the witnesses against him.321  The Lopez court agreed with the trial judge 
that the victim’s statement qualified as an excited utterance, but the court also stated 
that this determination did not necessarily mean that the statement was properly 
admitted into evidence.322  The court then analyzed whether the statement made by 
the victim to the police was testimonial under Crawford.323  The court concluded that 
the statement was not made as a result of an interrogation, nor was it made in any 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits or depositions.324  The court held 
that the statement was testimonial under Crawford because the victim made the 
statement with the reasonable expectation that it would be used as evidence in a 
subsequent court proceeding.325 
It was significant that the victim made his statement in direct response to a police 
officer’s question and that he accused the defendant of a crime in the statement.326  In 
its analysis, the Lopez court placed importance on the declarant’s purpose in making 
the statement: “[A] startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a 
police officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement is a form of 
accusation that will be used against the suspect.”327  The court contrasted such a 
                                                          
410 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 434 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2005), 
reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-5384, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4995 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006).   
316Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  




321Id. at 695-96. 
322Id. at 697. 
323Id. at 698. 
324Id. 
325Id. at 698-700. 
326Id. at 699. 
327See id.; see also People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 8, 2004) (stating that no categorical rule excludes excited utterances from the Crawford 
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statement to a spontaneous declaration made to friend or family member and 
reasoned that such a statement would unlikely be regarded as testimonial.328 
                                                          
analysis and each excited utterance must be analyzed on its own terms to determine whether 
Crawford applies).  But see Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding excited utterance not testimonial because it was unrehearsed, made without reflection 
or deliberation, and, therefore, not made in anticipation of its future use at trial), aff’d, 829 
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 
945, 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (reaching same conclusion as court in Fowler), aff’d, 829 
N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
328Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699.  The Lopez court’s analysis on this point is consistent with the 
statement in Crawford that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government 
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); see also State v. 
Aguilar, 107 P.3d 377, 379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“The only manner by which Crawford 
might be implicated is if the excited utterance is made in response to a police officer’s 
query.”); People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding domestic 
violence victim’s statements to a friend about the defendant’s conduct not testimonial because 
they were not made to a law enforcement or judicial officer), aff’d, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005); 
Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (Ga. 2004) (finding murder victim’s excited utterance 
to a friend two weeks before the murder not testimonial under Crawford); State v. Staten, 610 
S.E.2d 823, 827, 836 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statement of murder victim made during a 
private conversation with his roommate that defendant had “pulled a . . . gun” on him not 
testimonial under Crawford), cert. granted, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 93 (S.C. Mar. 9, 2006); State v. 
Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of Ms. Coble to Mr. 
Nordby, who was not a law enforcement agent, that Ms. Coble had seen a man with a pistol, 
tried to call 911, and was panic-stricken, not testimonial under Crawford), review denied, 113 
P.3d 482 (Wash. 2005); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 809 (finding no Confrontation Clause 
concerns with an out-of-court statement if the government did not assist in the production of 
such statement); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the 
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 518 (2005) (stating that one of the 
unresolved issues in Crawford is “whether statements must be elicited by questions from a 
government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by private individuals or 
interrogators working for private groups can also qualify”). 
The status of the statement’s recipient as a government agent or private individual is also 
an important factor in cases dealing with hearsay exceptions other than excited utterances.  See 
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of 
child sex abuse victim to a trained interviewer at a videotaped interview at which the deputy 
district attorney and an investigator from the district attorney’s office were present to be made 
under circumstances that would lead an objective observer to believe that the statement would 
be accessible at a subsequent prosecution and, therefore, testimonial under Crawford); People 
v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of child sex abuse victim 
to examining doctor, who was a member of child protection team and who spoke with the 
police before performing the examination, to be made under circumstances that would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be used prosecutorially and, 
therefore, testimonial under Crawford), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006); 
In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding statement of child 
sex abuse victim to grandmother testimonial under Crawford because the nature of the 
testimony, and not the official or unofficial nature of the person testifying, determines 
Crawford’s applicability), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005). 
In dissent, Justice Quinn stated that because the statements were not made to a 
governmental actor, the statements could not be considered testimonial under Crawford.  Id. at 
1041 (Quinn, J., dissenting).  In Justice Quinn’s view, even though Crawford did not 
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In People v. Cortes,329 the defendant was charged with various crimes in 
connection with the shooting of the victim.  At trial, the prosecution sought to 
introduce two separate 911 calls made by two different individuals who reported 
seeing the shooting.330  The trial court excluded one of the tapes because the 
statement on it was obtained through interrogation and was, therefore, testimonial.331  
The court admitted a redacted version of the other tape because the declarant was 
present at trial and subject to cross-examination.332 
On the excluded tape, the record revealed that the 911 operator had asked the 
caller a series of questions about the shooter’s location, description and direction of 
movement.333  The court reasoned that the circumstances of some 911 calls, 
specifically those calls that report a crime, come within the definition of 
interrogation.334  Because the procedures for 911 calls were established and had rules 
and recognized patterns for the collection of information, they constituted formal 
statements as that term is used in Crawford.335 
The Cortes court read Crawford as requiring a “reexamination of the basis for 
treating spontaneous declarations as admissible hearsay, including statements in a 
911 call reporting a crime.”336  In concluding that 911 calls to report a crime are 
testimonial, the court reasoned as follows: 
When a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information about 
the circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the information 
is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding; 
it makes no difference what the caller believes. 
. . . . 
The 911 call reporting a crime preserved on tape is the modern 
equivalent, made possible by technology, to the [pretrial] depositions 
taken by magistrates or [justices of the peace] under the Marian committal 
[act of 1555, which required preliminary examinations of prosecution 
witnesses to determine if the evidence was sufficient to hold the accused 
for trial].  Like the victims and witnesses before the King’s courts an 
objective reasonable person knows that when he or she reports a crime the 
                                                          
completely define “testimonial,” the Crawford Court’s formulation of the core class of 
testimonial statements would exclude the child’s statement to her grandmother.  Id.  
329People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
330Id. at 402. 
331Id. at 402-03. 
332Id. 
333Id. at 404. 
334Id. at 404-05. 
335Id. at 406. 
336Id. at 415. 
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss4/5
2006] TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS, EXCITED UTTERANCES 597 
statement will be used in an investigation and at proceedings relating to a 
prosecution.337 
The Cortes court put forth a “testimonial per se” rule with respect to 911 calls.  
The court stated that such calls are testimonial regardless of the caller’s beliefs.338  
There is debate as to whose perspective must be considered, the caller or the listener, 
in the determination of whether any statement, including a 911 call, is testimonial.339  
A bright line rule is somewhat easier for courts to apply because it allows them to 
avoid making distinctions that are, at times, difficult to decipher.  Ease of 
application, however, is no justification for excluding statements made by a victim in 
a 911 call who sought rescue or protection.340 
The Watson case illustrates that law enforcement agents can procure both 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements within a short period of time.  The 
analysis becomes more complicated when the court determines that a single 
statement serves more than one purpose.  In Davis, the court excluded a dual-purpose 
statement.  
Whether law enforcement agents obtained the statement at issue is significant but 
not always determinative.  In Lopez, the court placed great importance on the fact 
that the victim made the statement to the police.  In Powers, the court relied on the 
victim’s awareness of the protective order to conclude that the victim’s statement 
was primarily to provide evidence for a prosecution.  It is unclear whether the result 
would have been the same in the absence of such awareness. 
IV.  TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE STANDARD 
In order to assess the Crawford decision’s impact on the admissibility of excited 
utterances, the various factors discussed in Part III must be analyzed according to the 
three definitions of “testimonial” set forth in the opinion.  The goal will be to 
produce a clear delineation of those excited utterances that are admissible even after 
Crawford and those that would result in a Confrontation Clause violation if admitted.  
This Article will then propose a composite definition that will take into account the 
three definitions from Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases.  
Lastly, the Article will offer a slightly revised version of the composite definition 
that will take into account the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington.  
                                                                
337Id. at 415; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245, at 1193-1200. 
338Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 415. 
339See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (stating that the flaw in the definition of “testimonial” put forth by 
the United States in its amicus curiae brief, a definition that included the notion of statements 
“made in contemplation of legal proceedings,” was that it was unclear “whether the declarant 
or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings”); Mosteller, supra note 328, 
at 572 (discussing issues related to whose perspective matters in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial).   
340See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (cautioning “against the use 
of an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the admission or exclusion of 911 calls”), cert. denied, 126 
S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (declining to adopt 
a bright line rule on whether 911 calls are testimonial or nontestimonial); People v. Conyers, 
777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (admitting 911 call where caller’s intention in 
placing the call was to stop an assault), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
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The differences between the two definitions indicate that the Crawford decision did 
indeed cause a degree of “interim uncertainty.”341 
A.  First Definition: In-Court Testimony or its Functional Equivalent 
The Court in Crawford described the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” as 
“‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross examine [such as a deposition], or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’”342  The first part of this 
definition would not apply to excited utterances at all because statements in 
affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations would not typically qualify as 
excited utterances.  Declarants who provide statements in these formats usually 
provide them at some interval after any startling event or condition.  
The last portion of the Crawford definition, however, includes statements that a 
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.  This might include an 
extremely broad class of statements, but the qualifier—“similar pretrial 
statements”—requires the statements to be similar to the statements set forth in 
affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations.  These statements, in turn, are 
defined as the “functional equivalent” of ex parte in-court testimony.  Therefore, in 
order to qualify as a “testimonial statement” under the first definition in Crawford, it 
is insufficient for the declarant to reasonably expect the statement to be used 
prosecutorially.  Even if the declarant possesses this expectation, the statement must 
still be “similar” to a statement that is the “functional equivalent” of in-court 
testimony.  Stated another way, the statement must be only two steps removed from 
in-court testimony. 
Therefore, statements made to law enforcement agents where the declarant 
initiates the contact343 are not “testimonial statements” under this definition, and the 
cases that have addressed this scenario have reached the same conclusion.  To 
conclude that the statement is not testimonial simply because it is an excited 
utterance, as some of the cases do, does not take the analysis sufficiently far.344  The 
                                                                
341Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004). 
342Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23).  
343See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text. 
344The Court in Crawford sought to separate the protections provided by the Sixth 
Amendment from evidentiary rules regarding admissibility.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see 
also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2004) (describing Crawford as 
confirmation that rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are separate legal 
authorities); Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a 
Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 
185-86 (2004) (describing Crawford decision as a divorce between the Confrontation Clause 
and the hearsay rule).  But see Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 572-73 (Mass. 
2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part) (stating that prerequisites for excited utterance 
exception are incompatible with characteristics that make a statement testimonial), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006); State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 
171441, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2005) (stating that the essential characteristics that 
cause a statement to be an excited utterance render the statement nontestimonial), aff’d, 183 
S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 47 (2006). 
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more accurate formulation is that the statement is not testimonial because an excited 
utterance made by the declarant through the initiation of contact with law 
enforcement agents does not bear any similarity to pretrial statements such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations or testimony. 
Similarly, if the declarant’s purpose in making the statement is to obtain aid or to 
be protected from a dangerous situation, the statement is not testimonial under this 
definition.345  The courts have declined to characterize a statement as testimonial 
when the sole purpose of the statement is to obtain protection or to be rescued.  Even 
if the declarant is partially motivated by the desire to provide evidence for a future 
prosecution, such statements still fail to satisfy this definition of testimonial because 
the statements are neither the functional equivalent of in-court testimony nor are they 
similar to statements that qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony.  
In addition, excluding these statements from the class of statements that qualify as 
“testimonial” allows the police to perform one of their essential functions: aiding 
those in danger and providing protection to them. 
In many situations, statements that are produced as a result of questioning by law 
enforcement agents still qualify as excited utterances.346  Under Crawford, however, 
those statements are not admissible against a defendant at trial if they qualify as 
testimonial.347  The courts’ analysis in these instances is whether the questioning was 
structured or formal.  The precise focus in these instances is whether the questioning 
is sufficiently analogous to a “police interrogation” such that the resulting statement 
is testimonial.348 
The cases do not use the concept of “structured questioning” with any degree of 
consistency, which makes it difficult to draw solid conclusions about its meaning.  It 
is clear that the questioning does not constitute a “custodial examination” or “police 
interrogation” if the police are asking questions in the very early stage of the 
investigation in order to assess the situation and determine exactly what happened.349  
                                                                
345See supra notes 114-224 and accompanying text.  This view is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (declaring 
that a statement is nontestimonial when made in the context of an ongoing emergency). 
346See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 848-50 (Cal. Ct. App.), petition for review 
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d, 
184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
347E.g., Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 849-51. 
348Crawford was unequivocal in its assertion that statements procured by the police during 
an interrogation are testimonial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68.  Even though the Court in 
Crawford declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of testimonial, it stated that the term 
“applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Of course, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, the courts must now discern the 
“primary purpose of the interrogation.”  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.  It is not entirely clear 
whether this will facilitate compliance with the rule.  Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the standard in Davis “yields no 
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”). 
349Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-716 (Tex. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
925 (2005); Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855-57; Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006); Hammon 
v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d 
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When the police investigation has progressed to the point where it has begun to focus 
on a suspect, and the questions seek incriminating evidence about that particular 
suspect, the questioning is sufficiently structured to be a custodial examination or 
interrogation.350 
Even if the investigation has begun to focus on a suspect about whom the police 
are asking questions, statements given in response to such questions hardly seem to 
qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony. The statement at issue in 
Crawford was a formal, tape-recorded statement given at the police station some 
time after the incident itself.351  The statement was procured through police 
interrogation and bore a similarity to in-court testimony in a way that a statement 
given at the scene of the incident, or even at the hospital following the incident, does 
not. 
The courts that have applied Crawford are in agreement that when a declarant 
makes a statement for the purpose of producing evidence against an accused for use 
in a possible future prosecution, the statement is testimonial.352  The difficulty lies in 
moving from this abstract principle to its practical application.353  Part of the 
difficulty is that any statement provided to law enforcement agents who are 
investigating a criminal incident could presumably be used in a future prosecution if 
the perpetrator is apprehended and brought to trial.  The Crawford definition focuses 
on whether the declarant reasonably expects the statement to be used in a future 
prosecution.  The proposed composite definition will alleviate some of the 
uncertainty in this standard. 
If the statement constitutes a formal accusation of a criminal act, the statement is 
testimonial because the declarant can reasonably expect that it will be used in a 
subsequent prosecution.354  Because such formal accusations would likely qualify as 
pretrial statements that bear a close similarity to in-court testimony, the statements 
                                                          
sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-
04, 2004 WL 2726100 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004). 
350Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 851.  There is little dispute about the difficulty of distinguishing 
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay under Crawford.  See Davis v. State, 169 
S.W.3d 660, 672 (Tex. App. 2005), aff’d, 203 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
351Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-39.  In addition, the defendant’s wife had received Miranda 
warnings prior to giving the statement.  Id. at 38.  Professor Friedman characterized the fact 
pattern in Crawford as one involving “station house testimony.”  Friedman, supra note 344, at 
6.  Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that Sylvia Crawford made the majority 
of her statement in response to questions from the police.  State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 
2001 WL 850119, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001).  Because the questioning of Sylvia 
Crawford clearly qualified as “police interrogation,” the Court in Crawford never had to 
address the less obvious forms of such police activity.  Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 
N.E.2d 549, 564 n.2 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
2982 (2006). 
352See supra notes 292-340 and accompanying text. 
353See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in 
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a 
multitude of difficulties.”).  
354Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 698-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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are testimonial according to the first definition in Crawford.  If the declarant has 
some special knowledge about the criminal history of the alleged perpetrator,355 or 
accuses the alleged perpetrator of a particularly serious or violent crime,356 the 
statement is more likely to be characterized as testimonial.  As the cases illustrate, 
the focus on the declarant’s subjective expectations in making the statement may 
lead to results that are not entirely consistent with the specific holding of 
Crawford.357 
B.  Second Definition: Extrajudicial Statements in Formalized Testimonial Materials 
The Crawford Court took the second definition of testimonial statement directly 
from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White v. Illinois.358  The Court defined 
these materials as “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”359  This 
definition is strikingly similar to the first part of the initial definition set forth in 
Crawford.  The emphasis is on the formalized nature of the materials.  Therefore, the 
analysis of the factors under the first part of the initial definition would also apply 
here.  In addition, statements in the formalized materials described in the second 
definition are unlikely to qualify as excited utterances. 
C.  Third Definition: Reasonable Belief that Statement Will be Used at Trial 
The final, and perhaps most general, definition of testimonial from Crawford 
would include “‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.’”360  This definition is similar to the last portion of the first 
definition from Crawford, which talks about “‘pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used’” in a future prosecution.361  The difference is 
that the first definition talks about the declarant’s expectation of the use of the 
statement at trial.  The third definition states the standard in terms of an “objective 
witness.”  It goes beyond the beliefs and expectations of the particular declarant and 
establishes an objective standard.362 
                                                                
355State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1264-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
356People v. Ruiz, No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
357This inconsistency may explain why the Court in Davis articulated an objective 
standard for evaluating the circumstances surrounding the police interrogation and the 
resulting statements.  See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
358White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
359Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
360Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3). 
361Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23).  The Court in Davis took the 
objective standard one step further, stating it in terms of the circumstances involved in the 
police interrogation and the resulting statements and not in terms of the declarant.  See Davis, 
126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
362See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterating that the 
objective standard contemplates a reasonable person in the declarant’s position); Wall v. State, 
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Moreover, this third definition is primarily responsible for the inconsistent results 
in the cases.  One of the important factors in the application of this definition is the 
status of the person to whom the statement was made.363  It also provides the lower 
courts applying Crawford with a level of discretion that perhaps the Supreme Court 
did not contemplate when it decided Crawford.364 
Statements made to law enforcement agents for the purpose of obtaining aid or 
protection are not testimonial under this definition.  Under this objective standard, 
such statements would not be available for use at a later trial because their purpose is 
to neutralize a dangerous situation.  Statements made at the police station or in a 
similar investigative environment, especially when made in response to structured 
police questioning, are testimonial.  Such statements are testimonial even if they 
qualify as excited utterances under state evidentiary law because an objective witness 
would expect the statements to be available for later use at trial.  Even though this 
standard is phrased in terms of an “objective witness,” a particular declarant’s 
knowledge that a statement will be used in a future prosecution is a factor to consider 
in the determination of whether the statement is testimonial.365 
D.  Composite Definition 
 A final, composite definition of testimonial, which would be based on the 
formulations in the Crawford decision and refined through an examination of the 
cases dealing with excited utterances, would read as follows: 
 
Testimonial evidence means 
(a) Ex parte in-court testimony, including prior testimony during a 
court proceeding such as a preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, 
motion hearing or trial; 
(b) statements set forth in sworn affidavits; 
(c)  statements set forth in depositions; 
(d)  statements that constitute formal confessions; or 
                                                          
184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[T]he legal ruling of whether a statement is 
testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable 
declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant.”). 
363See Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a 
statement to a friend or family member is not made for the purpose of accusing someone in the 
same way as a statement to a person of authority). 
364See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (Howard, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (“Many courts have resolved [the] uncertainty [created by 
Crawford] by seizing on the most general formulation [of testimonial, which is the third 
definition], and applying it, without sufficient attention to Crawford’s textual and historical 
rationale.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 
(Cal. Ct. App.) (holding narrowly that despite three different definitions set out in Crawford, 
statements made in response to police interrogation are testimonial), petition for review 
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
365See People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 
2004) (finding that interrogation occurs where declarant is aware that law enforcement agent’s 
purpose in asking questions is to gather information to aid in suspect’s prosecution). 
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(e)  other pretrial statements that are substantially similar to those 
items listed in subsections (a)-(d) that: 
(i)  are provided in response to questions from law enforcement 
agents when the agents have thoroughly assessed a situation or 
incident and have begun to focus their investigation on a particular 
suspect or suspects; 
(ii)  are provided in response to questions from law enforcement 
agents when such questions are detailed, structured, formal and 
logically organized in a way that seeks specific, incriminating 
evidence about a suspect or suspects; 
(iii)  are provided in response to questions from someone other 
than a law enforcement agent when the questioning is conducted in 
the presence of a law enforcement agent, at the behest and 
direction of a law enforcement agent, or by a person directly 
associated with the government’s investigation, and has the 
characteristics of the questions in subsection (e)(ii); or 
(iv)  formally accuse a suspect of a specific crime when the 
declarant has some particular knowledge of the suspect or the 
nature of the crime. 
Subsection (e) of this definition incorporates the concept of “statements that were 
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”  It sets forth the 
general standard with a level of specificity that will make the standard more readily 
applicable to new fact situations involving excited utterances.  As illustrated by the 
cases, the general standard is unpredictable and difficult to apply.  The Court in 
Crawford abandoned the Roberts test for the same reason.  Subsection (e) attempts to 
specify the “circumstances” that would cause a statement to qualify as testimonial, 
and most of the situations in subsection (e) are a variation of police interrogation.366 
An analysis of whether a particular manner of questioning by law enforcement 
agents constitutes a custodial examination or interrogation must begin with the 
Crawford case itself.  Sylvia Crawford’s statement to the police was not an excited 
utterance, but it is the appropriate starting point for a determination of the limitations 
on questioning by law enforcement agents.  The manner in which Sylvia Crawford 
provided her statement to the police was completely different from a situation in 
which the declarant makes a statement at the scene of an incident to law enforcement 
agents, even if that statement is made in response to some degree of questioning.367 
                                                                
366See Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?, 
28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 321-22 (2005) (“At a minimum, . . . the Confrontation Clause 
appears to apply to statements knowingly made to police in response to police-initiated 
questions seeking incriminating information.”). 
367See Robert William Best, To be or Not to be Testimonial?  That is the Question:  2004 
Developments in the Sixth Amendment, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2005, at 65, 79. (“Whatever else can 
be said about the Crawford opinion, the issue of Sylvia’s statement given during a police 
interrogation was the issue of the case; everything else the Court addressed served as 
background for the question before it.”). 
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It is more likely that an excited utterance will implicate Crawford under one of 
the situations in subsection (e) of the definition.  A statement that meets the standard 
in subsection (e) of the definition must still be “substantially similar” to the 
formalized materials listed in subsections (a)-(d) in order to qualify as a testimonial 
statement.  Establishing a direct link between the statement in subsection (e) and the 
specific examples of formalized materials in subsections (a)-(d) will provide courts 
with more guidance in their application of the Crawford decision.368 
Moreover, this connection finds support in the Crawford decision.  After setting 
out the various formulations of testimonial statements, the Court stated that “[t]hese 
formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] 
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”369  Perhaps the 
“common nucleus” was that the statement must contain a degree of formality or 
structure similar to those listed by the Court, and the belief in its availability for use 
at a later trial was simply a “level of abstraction around” this requirement.  The 
formulation in subsection (e) of the composite definition transforms the abstract 
notion of “belief in availability for use at a later trial” into readily identifiable and 
specific examples.  An excited utterance that fails to satisfy one of the formulations 
in subsection (e) is unlikely to qualify as a testimonial statement.  Thus, its 
admissibility at trial would be determined according to state evidentiary law. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, lower courts tested the 
parameters of the third definition from Crawford.  In such cases, courts examined the 
level of accuracy and precision in the declarant’s accusation and the seriousness of 
the crime.  A victim who simply points out the perpetrator to the police upon their 
arrival on the scene (That’s the man who hit me) cannot be said to have met the 
standard in subsection (e) of the definition.  It is most likely that the victim is either 
initiating the contact, seeking protection or both.  In addition, a victim or witness 
who provides information to the police in response to general, informal questions 
(What’s going on here? or What happened?) is not providing testimonial evidence in 
accordance with subsection (e).370  The focus under this definition must be on the 
statement’s nature and purpose and not on the declarant’s emotional state.371  
Similarly, a declarant who provides a statement to the police in response to 
formal and direct questioning is more likely to produce a statement that meets the 
standard in subsection (e).  The circumstances surrounding such a statement would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution.  This is the point at which state 
evidentiary law and the Confrontation Clause part ways.  The statement may qualify 
                                                                
368See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 570-71 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., 
concurring in part) (emphasizing the importance of articulating a definition of “testimonial” 
that harmonizes all three formulations from Crawford), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006). 
369Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
370See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 351, 353-54 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005), cert. 
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding case to the Court of 
Appeals of Alaska for further consideration in light of Davis); United States v. Webb, No. 
DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *3-5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004).  See also supra note 
88. 
371Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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as an excited utterance, but as a testimonial statement, it can be admitted at trial only 
if the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statement.372 
It is clear that the Crawford decision presents new challenges in the area of 
domestic violence crimes because the prosecution of such cases relies heavily on 
statements made at the scene to law enforcement authorities and in 911 calls.373  
Placing the emphasis on the statement itself and not on whether the person to whom 
it was made is a government agent has the potential to expand the class of statements 
that will be inadmissible under Crawford.   
One of the unresolved issues in Crawford is “whether statements must be elicited 
by questions from a government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by 
private individuals or interrogators working for private groups can also qualify.”374  
Under the appropriate circumstances, a statement made to a private citizen would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution.375  The standard in subsection (e)(iii) of 
the definition contemplates such circumstances and attempts to bring some clarity to 
this point.  On the other hand, the absence of government officials from the 
interaction negates the potential for abuse that concerned the Court in Crawford.376 
It is important to be cognizant of two other aspects of the Crawford decision in 
this context.  The first is the statement in the majority opinion that “[a]n accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a 
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”377  On the other 
hand, the cases illustrate that accusers sometimes make formal statements to 
acquaintances378 and casual remarks to government officers.379  The lower courts 
                                                                
372See, e.g., State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding statement 
both an admissible excited utterance under Ohio law and an inadmissible testimonial statement 
under Crawford), appeal allowed, 847 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006). 
373See Jaros, supra note 245, at 1000-03; King-Ries, supra note 366, at 305, 318; Lininger, 
supra note 61, at 768-83, 816; Donna D. Bloom, Comment, “Utter Excitement” About 
Nothing:  Why Domestic Violence Evidence-Based Prosecution Will Survive Crawford v. 
Washington, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717 (2005); Celeste E. Byrom, Note, The Use of the Excited 
Utterance Hearsay Exception in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases after Crawford 
v. Washington, 24 REV. LITIG. 409 (2005). 
Both of the cases before the Supreme Court in Davis were domestic violence cases.  Davis 
v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279-80 (2006).  The respondents in those cases, the states of 
Washington and Indiana, argued that such cases “require[] greater flexibility in the use of 
testimonial evidence.”  Id. at 2279.  The Court acknowledged that victims of domestic 
violence are particularly susceptible to intimidation or coercion and that they often decline to 
testify at trial.  Id. at 2279-80.  The constitutional guarantees, however, must still be the 
primary concern.  Id. at 2280. 
374Mosteller, supra note 328, at 518.  The issue remains unresolved.  See Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2274 n.2 (“[O]ur holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when 
statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”). 
375See supra note 328. 
376Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
377Id. at 51. 
378See In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), petition for 
appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).  
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need guidance on whether the admission of such statements against defendants 
violates their rights under the Confrontation Clause.380  Subsection (e) of the 
composite definition provides this guidance.  
The second aspect of the decision is the concern expressed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in his concurring opinion that “any classification of statements as 
testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat 
arbitrary.”381  Certainly sworn affidavits and depositions are part of the core class of 
testimonial statements.  A classification of other statements as testimonial, including 
certain excited utterances, need not be arbitrary.  If the basis of that classification is 
an objective belief in that statement’s availability for use at a later trial, the statement 
must be in a format that is substantially similar to a sworn affidavit or deposition and 
must meet one of the standards set forth in subsection (e) of the proposed composite 
definition.  In this way, the appropriate balance will be struck between an accused’s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause and the government’s ability to prosecute its 
cases. 
Application of the proposed composite definition would be consistent with 
Crawford.  The definition must be slightly altered, however, in light of the Davis 
decision.  The most significant difference after Davis is that the statements described 
in subsection (e) of the definition need not be “substantially similar” to the 
statements listed in subsections (a)-(d).  As illustrated by Hammon v. Indiana, the 
companion case to Davis v. Washington, the statement can qualify as testimonial 
                                                          
379See United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *1-3 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 9, 2004); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006). 
380See Friedman, supra note 344, at 9 (stating that participation by government officials is 
not the essence of what makes a statement testimonial). 
381Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  This view is reflected in three 
United States Circuit Court decisions issued after Crawford involving hearsay exceptions 
other than excited utterances in which the courts held that statements, which did not involve 
police or government agents, were not testimonial.  See Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-
45 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding victim’s statements to numerous witnesses prior to the victim’s 
murder by her husband not to fit the definition of “testimonial” under Crawford), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 1067 (2005); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) (declining to find 
as testimonial statements to a third party witness, made by person who had accompanied 
accused on the day of murder, that accused needed money and that victim had refused to give 
him drugs on credit), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 
832, 837-38, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (testimony of victim’s half brother regarding victim’s 
statements to him implicating the defendant properly admitted because statements were “not 
the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”). 
One case that admitted a testimonial statement was People v. Ko, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1051 (2006).  At trial, a detective who had 
investigated the murder testified to statements made by the defendant’s girlfriend about bloody 
clothing found at the murder scene.  Id. at 44.  Even though the statements were testimonial, 
they were not barred by Crawford because the defendant opened the door to the admission of 
the entire statement concerning clothing found at the murder scene.  Id. at 44-45.  The court 
was concerned that “[a] contrary holding would allow a defendant to mislead the jury by 
selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial statement that are potentially helpful to 
the defense, while concealing from the jury other details that would tend to explain the 
portions introduced and place them in context.”  Id. at 45. 
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even if it is made at the scene of the incident itself, as long as it is made after the 
incident is over382 “at some remove in time from the danger.”383  Subsections (e)(ii) 
and (e)(iv) of the definition remain unchanged because they more clearly qualify as 
testimonial statements after Davis.  Subsection (e)(iii) remains unchanged and 
unresolved, but it seems that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of 
classifying such statements as testimonial. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Crawford established a new standard for the admission of testimonial statements 
by a witness who is not present at trial.  It overruled the standard in Ohio v. Roberts, 
which examined whether the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability, because 
the standard in Roberts provided inadequate protection for defendants’ rights under 
the Confrontation Clause. 
An understanding of Crawford’s effect on the admissibility of excited utterances 
requires an understanding of which statements the Crawford Court meant to include 
in its definition of “testimonial statement.”  Rather than focusing exclusively on 
whether the recipient of the statement is a government officer or private citizen, the 
analysis must focus on whether the statement meets one of the standards set forth in 
subsection (e) of the proposed composite definition.  Even if the statement satisfies 
one of the standards, however, the statement must bear an appreciable similarity to 
formalized materials such as affidavits and depositions.  This analysis is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s statement in Crawford that all formulations of testimonial 
statements “share a common nucleus.”384  
If the declarant initiates contact with law enforcement agents to seek aid or 
protection, the statement is not testimonial.  If there is some degree of formal or 
structured questioning to procure the statement, then it is testimonial even if it 
qualifies as an excited utterance.  If the questioning meets the standard, the 
questioner need not necessarily be a law enforcement agent.  The questioning need 
only be conducted at the behest or in the presence of a law enforcement agent. 
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Crawford v. 
Washington.  The degree of formality or structure in the questioning is no longer the 
primary consideration in determining whether the responses to those questions 
constitute testimonial statements.  Rather, the focus seems to be on the timing of the 
questioning and whether it takes place at a point removed in time from the 
threatening situation that gave rise to it. 
Both federal and states courts will continue to develop and interpret the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Crawford and Davis.  It remains to be seen whether the “primary 
purpose”385 test from Davis will produce consistent results, or results that require 
further clarification. 
                                                                
382Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278-79 (2006). 
383Id. at 2279. 
384Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
385Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
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